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The Rule of Law in the
Technological Age
Challenges and opportunities for the EU
Introduction
Maria Weimer, Kati Cseres and Christina Eckes
Technological innovations are crucial drivers of economic, social, and
environmental progress. Law and regulation are expected to enable
innovation while protecting society from unintended consequences, such as
risks to public health and the environment, privacy, data protection, and
other fundamental rights and interests. However, law is often considered
either as an obstacle to innovations or as unable to protect society from
their risks. Moreover, the very notion of the Rule of Law as a principle
governing legitimate exercise of power in democratic societies is
undergoing change, and, in some extreme cases, might even be challenged
where technological fixes are replacing traditional legal rules.
This collection of policy papers is based on the sixth annual conference
hosted by the Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance at the
University of Amsterdam on 4 November 2016. Against the backdrop of
revolutionary technological developments in the digital world as well as
the impacts of technological innovations on health, safety and the
environment, the conference has explored the relationship between law
and technology with a particular focus on challenges and opportunities for
EU law and regulation. As demonstrated by this collection of papers, new
technologies (e.g. Big Data analytics, digital platforms, bio- and
nanotechnologies) have the potential to transform the very nature of law as
an institution including the operation of legal rules and of key concepts,
such as the rule of law, legal certainty, and rights protection. Moreover, the
scientific complexity of technology regulation and the increasing reliance
on both non-legal expertise and non-state actors affect the nature of law
making and enforcement. A key question running through all the
contributions concerns the capacity of law to normatively steer
technological development, and to ensure the legitimate use of
technological power.
In his contribution, Roger Brownsword provides for a birds-eye
perspective on the relationship between the principle of the Rule of Law,
rules of law and technological management. He draws our attention to the
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dual function of technology in a regulatory setting: technology as a
regulatory target and technology as a regulatory tool. The speed and
complexity of regulating technological risks as targets present, above all,
the challenge of devising adequate (i.e. socially acceptable and effective)
regulatory frameworks. However, for Brownsword, the more radical
challenge to the Rule of Law lies in the emergence of technological
management as a regulatory tool to steer human behaviour. His
contribution identifies key questions for legal theorizing in the
technological age, and provides first insights as to the continuing relevance
of the Rule of Law for securing a legitimate exercise of power in our
societies.
In fact, our ideas about whose power should be effectively controlled by
whom and with what instruments are also undergoing change in the
technological age. This is well illustrated by the respective contributions by
Orla Lynskey on the regulation of ‘platform power’ on the one hand; and
by Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice Stucke on anti-competitive practices in the
virtual economy on the other hand.
Lynskey shows that digital platforms, such as YouTube, Twitter, Amazon,
Facebook etc, not only require regulation, but also are regulating us. This
form of private ordering by code has, according to her, ‘implications for
economic, social, cultural and political dimensions of our lives.’ Lynskey’s
contribution reveals the different types of impact, which platform power
has on fundamental rights, such as the freedom of expression, privacy and
data protection. The search for adequate regulatory options to ensure
digital rights protection vis-à-vis digital platforms is, however, still open.
While competition law focuses too narrowly on economic impacts, other
forms of public regulatory intervention require a fundamental re-thinking
of the function and logic of fundamental rights when endangered by
private, rather than state power. Or – and this refers us back to the role of
technological management as discussed by Brownsword – we might need
to resort to non-legal modes of regulation, such as technological fixes, to
protect fundamental rights.
Ezrachi and Stucke’s contribution also shows the limitations of current
competition law approaches in the enforcement of fair virtual competition.
They show that with the changing dynamics of online competition, some
practices, such as algorithm-driven tacit collusion and behavioural
discrimination in the online market, may remain ‘beyond the law’s reach’;
or even be considered legal despite their adverse effects on producers,
consumers and society. They warn that ‘current markets are far from
perfect competition. The invisible hand that we rely upon can be pushed
aside by the “digitized hand”. (…) The resulting environment operates
with rules different from the ones we assume in the theoretical economic
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models, and can yield new forms of anticompetitive behaviour that reduce
our welfare.’
Returning to the question of how to design adequate regulation for new
technologies, the following contributions explore the challenges to the Rule
of Law created by scientific uncertainty and the need to promote socially
beneficial technological innovations. In a similar vein as Brownsword,
Indra Spieker genannt Döhmann shows in her contribution that technology
and law are two different systems with different rationalities and
languages, which makes frictions between them inevitable. At the same
time, to regulate technology effectively, the main task of the legal system
becomes the gathering of complex techno-scientific information – a process
that cognitively opens the legal system to the technological system. This
creates enormous challenges to both legislation and law enforcement given
that the assessment of technological risk is more often than not surrounded
by scientific uncertainty.
The precautionary principle has been originally conceived to address
scientific uncertainty. However, its application in EU law and policy is
often hampered by controversy. One of the reasons is that the principle
often fails to translate scientific uncertainty into legal certainty; law relies
on facts and evidence and therefore tends to be resistant to acknowledging
scientific uncertainty. Geert van Calster, Kathleen Garnett and Leonie Reins,
therefore, suggest overcoming this current blockage in the application of
the precautionary principle by introducing a ‘public needs analysis’ for
technological innovations. Such an analysis would require regulators to
weed out products and technologies, which offer little or no benefit to
society. Van Calster et al. show that embryonic forms of a needs/or public
benefit assessment already exist in Europe. At the same time, the authors
acknowledge that, at first sight, a needs-based assessment would go against
our engrained belief that where adverse effects of a technology on human
health or the environment cannot be proven, a product should be allowed
on the market. They also identify Rule of Law challenges of introducing a
needs assessment, in particular with regard to legal certainty and
(especially economic) fundamental rights. Yet, given the uncertainty
surrounding technological risk assessment and the irreversibility of some
of the potential long term impacts, both legal scholars and policy makers
would do well in devising mechanisms to ensure that we take technological
risks only for those innovations that benefit society as a whole.
These tensions between markets and society lie at the heart of technology
regulation. Tamara Hervey’s contribution explores the role of EU internal
market law in framing the way we understand and regulate technology in
the Union. Given that much of EU law on new technologies falls within the
EU competence to regulate the internal market, does market rationality
dominate EU regulation in this field at the expense of other values, such as
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fundamental rights or ethical concerns? Hervey concludes that EU law
cannot be considered as constitutionally fixed in this respect. Rather, it
envisages a market that is respectful of fundamental rights and solidaritybased welfare settlements, as well as precautionary. Only by recognising
the open nature of EU law, can we hold the EU institutions to account on
the basis of the above mentioned constitutional commitments of an
embedded market when they make, apply, or interpret EU law, and when
they regulate technology.
The contributions collected in this volume offer an array of insights about
both the challenges and opportunities of technology for the legal system,
the principle of the Rule of Law as well as for the welfare of our societies
more generally. Different questions are raised depending on whether we
look at technology as regulatory target or regulatory tool; and depending
on the particular type of technology as well as its risks and benefits. Overall,
the contributions show that the relationship between law and technology is
more complex than one-directional accounts are able to tell. By framing
technology regulation in a certain way law (including EU law) is able to
shape technological innovations thereby encouraging or discouraging
different types of innovations. At the same time, it is clear that technology,
too, shapes the law potentially transforming its key principles and values.
This collection is therefore also a call for reinventing jurisprudence in the
technological age; and for legal theorizing that would be able, to use Sheila
Jasanoff’s words, ‘to articulate the principles by which technologies are
empowered to rule us.’1

1

S. Jasanoff (2016): The Ethics of Invention (New York: W.W. Norton), 9-10.
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The Rule of Law, Rules of Law, and
Technological Management
Roger Brownsword

1. Introduction
How are we to engage with our conference topic, ‘The Rule of Law in the
Technological Age’? One approach is to view the technologies of our time
as regulatory targets and to think about the challenges involved in ensuring
that the development, application, and use of these technologies (by
regulatees) is compliant with the Rule of Law. Another approach is to view
the same technologies as potential regulatory tools, in which case the
challenge is to ensure that the use of these tools by regulators is compliant
with the Rule of Law. Of course, if we are to put in place an acceptable
regulatory environment for our Technological Age, we need to ensure that
the development, use, and application of emerging technologies, whether
as targets or as tools, is compatible with the Rule of Law (Brownsword and
Yeung, 2008).
In this short essay, I will primarily focus on the questions raised by
technologies being employed as regulatory tools. However, before doing so,
let me say a few words about the generic challenges that are implicated in
the governance of emerging technologies viewed as regulatory targets.
2. The generic challenges presented by new technologies as regulatory
targets
Elsewhere, I have suggested that regulators face a number of generic
challenges in engaging with new technologies (Brownsword, 2008;
Brownsword and Goodwin, 2012). From a traditional legal perspective, the
most striking challenge is the difficulty of identifying the right time to
legislate and then drafting legislation in terms that are reasonably
sustainable. The speed at which both biotechnologies and information and
communication technologies have developed since the turn of the

© Roger Brownsword

Professor of Law, King’s College London and Bournemouth University. This is an
edited version of the introductory keynote that I gave at the ACELG’s sixth annual
conference on November 4, 2016.
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century—in fields as different as embryology and data processing—have
already underlined the challenge of maintaining regulatory connection.
Even if a regulatory framework is adequately connected, its terms might
not be socially acceptable. In twenty-first century Europe, where citizens
expect to enjoy the benefits of innovation but also expect technologies to be
safe and to be applied in ways that respect fundamental values, regulators
will face the triple demand that they should act in ways that:


support rather than stifle beneficial innovation;



manage risks to human health and safety and the environment at an
acceptable level; and



respect community values (such as privacy and confidentiality,
freedom of expression, human rights and human dignity, and the
like).

The challenges generated by this triple demand reside, first, in the tensions
that can exist between each of these demands and, secondly, in the tensions
that are hidden within each demand.
With regard to the first of these challenges, regulators will find that, while
the innovation lobby will argue for light touch regulation, for strong IPRs,
for tax breaks and so on, others will remind regulators (i) that there need to
be proper ex ante risk assessments and precautions in place and (ii) that,
without adequate regulatory oversight, fundamental values such as respect
for human rights and human dignity might be compromised. This
demands a ‘proportionate’ response by regulators, weighing the burden on
innovators (and, possibly, the delayed enjoyment of benefits) against
community concerns for safety and respect for values—which, of course,
restates rather than resolves the challenge.
Turning to the second of the challenges, we find that each of the three
demands hinges on a deeply contested concept. In particular, what kind of
innovation is ‘beneficial’—beneficial to whom, beneficial in meeting whose
needs, beneficial relative to which human interests, and so on; and, are the
benefits of the innovatory work likely to be realised at once, within the next
five years, or at some unspecified time in the future? With regard to safety,
what is an ‘acceptable’ risk? Notoriously, professional risk-assessors differ
from the lay view in characterising a technology as ‘low risk’ (inviting a
leap to ‘safe’) where the likelihood of harm eventuating is low,
notwithstanding that on anyone’s view the harm in question is extremely
serious. Moreover, how is the risk distributed; who is it that benefits and
who is it that bears the risk? Last, but not least, which values are to be
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treated as relevant? Which value system do we support—one based on
rights, or on duties, or one that is geared towards maximising utility (for
this triangle of values, see Brownsword, 2003)? If we base ourselves on
rights, then which rights (negative only or negative and positive, libertarian
or liberal-welfare, and so on); if duties, then which duties (for example,
Kantian or communitarian); if privacy, then which of the many conceptions
of privacy (see e.g., Laurie, 2002); and, if human dignity, then which of the
many conceptions of human dignity, and so on (see, e.g., Beyleveld and
Brownsword, 2001; and Duwell, Braavig, Brownsword, and Mieth (eds),
2014)?
Beyond these dilemmas and trilemmas, regulators are also expected to
make effective interventions. While the challenge of regulatory
effectiveness is already considerable without the complications introduced
by new technologies, there is no doubt that the ready availability of goods
and services in a global online marketplace does nothing to ease the
difficulties faced by national regulators.
If regulators are not able to ensure that regulatees develop, apply, and use
new technologies in ways that are consistent with the regulatory
framework, there will be a failure relative to the Rule of Law; but the
regulatory framework itself will also be judged to be inadequate—an
inadequacy that might also be expressed as a deficit relative to the Rule of
Law— if it fails to meet the triple demand addressed to regulators.
Important and complex though these challenges are, I will focus now on
the other prong of exploration, the idea of technology operating as a
regulatory instrument.
3. New technologies as regulatory instruments
In her latest book, Sheila Jasanoff suggests that, even though ‘technological
systems rival legal constitutions in their power to order and govern
society…there is no systematic body of thought, comparable to centuries of
legal and political theory, to articulate the principles by which technologies
are empowered to rule us.’ (Jasanoff, 2016: 9-10) In other words, we need to
reinvent jurisprudence so that its context is given by today’s technologies
(compare Brownsword, 2016a).
Before we have a new jurisprudence, though, we need to identify the key
questions for our theorising. It seems to me that two such questions are as
follows.
First, when smart regulatory technologies are pervasive, being
incorporated in products, places, and people, what is the relevance of the
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Rule of Law? In other words, when regulatory purposes are served by
technological systems and technostructures, when ‘technological
management’ rules, what (if any) is the continuing relevance of the Rule of
Law?
Secondly, to the extent that our regulatory purposes are served by
technological management rather than by rules, what is the future for rules
of law? Will the disruption brought about by technological management
mean that some legal rules are redundant, or that they need to be
redirected, or perhaps simply revised?
Let me offer a few reflections in response to these two questions.
(i) Technological Management and the Relevance of the Rule of Law
While there are many different accounts of the Rule of Law and, to a much
lesser extent, the ideal of legality, all accounts assume that law involves an
exercise of power (and authority) as rules, standards, or norms are set for
compliance. Law is an affair of rules; and the Rule of Law both prescribes
and presupposes rule by rules (Fuller, 1969).
Assistive technologies, such as CCTV surveillance or DNA profiling, might
be deployed in support of certain rules. Here, the technology supports and
encourages compliance with the background rules but it does not
guarantee compliance and the situation remains one that is rule-governed.
By contrast, the distinctive characteristic of technological management is
that it does not function by setting rules; it does not prescribe what one
ought or ought not to do; rather, it seeks either to force or to preclude
certain acts, or to exclude or restrain certain agents, channelling conduct
directly without the intermediation of rules or ‘oughts’.
In the paradigmatic case of technological management


a regulator, R, has a view about whether regulatees should be
prohibited, permitted, or required to do x (the underlying
normative view)



R’s view could be expressed in the form of a rule that prohibits,
permits, or requires the doing of x (the underlying rule)



but, R uses (or directs others to use) some measures of technological
management rather than a rule



and R’s intention in doing so is to translate the underlying
normative view into a practical design that ensures that regulatees
do or do not do x (according to the underlying rule)
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the ensuing outcome being that regulatees find themselves in
environments where the immediate signals relate to what can and
cannot be done, to possibilities and impossibilities, rather than (as
with prescriptive rules) to what ought or ought not to be done.

There is also the possibility that R adopts technological measures (perhaps
for reasons of safety or efficiency) that are not, as such, intended to
translate an underlying normative view but which have similar regulatory
effects. For example, if regulators—instead of relying on drink-driving
laws—were to require manufacturers of motor vehicles to fit sensors that
would detect if a person were attempting to drive under the influence of
drink or drugs, and then (if so) immobilise the vehicle, this would be a
paradigmatic case of technological management. However, where
regulators simply authorise autonomous vehicles to run on the roads, then
one of the regulatory effects is to limit the opportunities that humans have
to drive which, in turn, has the effect of limiting the opportunities that
humans have to drive under the influence of drink or drugs.
The question that now arises is the following: can we sensibly apply ideals
like the Rule of Law and legality that speak to an enterprise of rule-making
and rule-application to the quite different enterprise of technological
management where there seem to be neither rules to be made nor rules to
be applied? How, for example, can we make sense of requirements such as
that laws should be published, that rules should be clear, non-contradictory,
prospective, and so on, where technological management supersedes rules?
How can technological management violate the principle of legality by
requiring the impossible when, quite unlike a rule, its measures redefine
what is possible and impossible in a particular regulatory space? The short
answer is that, even if we cannot literally copy across the principles of
legality from rules to technological measures, we can and must continue to
apply the spirit of the Rule of Law to the regulatory use of technological
management (Brownsword, 2016b).
As I read it, the spirit of the Rule of Law is to constrain power. A
community that subscribes to the Rule of Law rejects the idea that those
who are powerful can do just what they want, however they want, to the
less powerful. The exercise of power is to be properly authorised; power is
not to be applied in an arbitrary way. Given that technological
management represents a potent way of exercising power, it has to be
constrained; it needs to be properly authorised; and the Rule of Law—
expressing a founding compact between those who govern and those who
are governed, calling on the one side for legitimate governance and, on the
other, for responsible citizenship—continues to be of critical importance. So,
how does this translate into a new understanding of the Rule of Law? What
exactly is the New Deal that licenses the use of technological management?
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In the first instance, proposals for the use of assistive technologies—such as
CCTV or DNA profiling, or the smart machines now being deployed to aid
and advise decision-makers in the criminal justice system—need to be
transparent and open to debate; and, if it is claimed that they are out of line
with the Rule of Law, then they should be reviewable. Famously, the
broad-sweep use of DNA profiling has been successfully challenged at the
European Court of Human Rights (in S and Marper v United Kingdom
[2008] ECHR 1581); and the use of smart machines in the context of
decisions about stop and search, bail, and custodial terms is likely to
provoke challenges that reflect concerns about the hidden racial bias that
might be built into the machines’ calculations (O’Neil, 2016) as well as the
systemic pressure to correct more readily for false negatives than false
positives (Roth, 2016).
When it is proposed that full-scale technological management should be
used, whether to force or to preclude certain acts, there again needs to be
an open debate about the purposes for which these measures are to be
employed. Quite simply, if a rule would not be authorised for use in a
particular case, then neither should technological management. However,
even if a rule would be authorised, it does not follow that technological
management, too, would be authorised; there might be additional
conditions to be satisfied. After all, the complexion of the regulatory
environment is fundamentally different where technological management
displaces rules (Brownsword, 2011).
What kind of further conditions might be set for the use of technological
management? This is where the jurisprudence, as Sheila Jasanoff remarks,
is meagre. Here are four tentative suggestions.
First, there might be a condition about the compatibility of technological
management with the responsibility that we each have as individual moral
agents for making our own judgment as to what is the right thing to do.
Even if the technological measures are in line with what we judge to be the
right thing, how important is it that we freely choose to do the right thing?
In whatever spaces are not subject to technological management, are there
sufficient opportunities for moral development and for agents to freely
choose to do the right thing? If the technological measure is out of line with
our own moral judgment, how far may a society compel one of its citizens
to act against his or her conscience? Do we wish to retain the opportunity
to express dissent by acts of civil disobedience (see Morozov, 2013)? Does
this mean that we should bar the use of technological management where
the policy or underlying rule is deeply morally contested in a community
(Brownsword, 2017a)?
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Secondly, there might be a condition that reserves the possibility of a
human override. In the case of driverless cars, for example, we might want
to give agents the opportunity to take control of the vehicle in order to deal
with some hard moral choice (whether of a ‘trolley’ or a ‘tunnel’ nature) or
to respond to an emergency (perhaps involving a ‘rescue’ of some kind).
Beyond this, we might want to reserve the possibility of an appeal to
humans against a decision that triggers an application of technological
management that forces or precludes a particular act or that excludes a
particular person or class of persons.
Thirdly, it might be a condition for the use of technological management
that the restrictive scope of the measures or their forcing range should be
no greater than would be the case were a rule to be used. In this sense, the
sweep of technological management should be co-extensive with that of the
equivalent rule.
Finally, there might be a condition that interventions involving
technological management should be reversible—a condition that might be
particularly important if measures of this kind are designed not only into
products and places but also into people, as might be the case if regulators
contemplate making interventions in not only the coding of product
software but also the genomic coding of particular individuals.
(ii) Technological Management and Rules of Law
The second question, it will be recalled, asks about the fate of rules in an
era of technological management. In future, for example, what will protect
the safety of pedestrians and road users will be on-board vehicle
technologies rather than the provisions of road traffic laws or the highway
code. There might be rules that instruct designers of vehicles or the like but
rules directed to human drivers will be a thing of the past. So, what is the
future of rules of law?
Briefly, it seems to me that we can expect some rules to be replaced or
rendered redundant by measures of technological management (for
example, where human operators are taken out of the equation by
automation, this might render various rules about health and safety—in
both the criminal law and in torts—or insurance or employment, and so on,
redundant). To some extent, there might be a redirection of rules as they
are addressed to the designers of various technologies rather than to those
whose conduct is controlled by the technologies. Inevitably, too, there will
need to be some revision of current rules (for example, as the
technostructures for transactions increasingly shape the deal and its
performance, there will need to be some revision of the rules of contract
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law and competition law, particularly to protect consumers) (Ezrachi and
Stucke, 2016; Brownsword, 2017b).
If this is the future, is there any reason to regret the passing of rules and
their replacement with measures of technological management? In some
domains, there might be little to regret. For example, if people are happy to
have their routine consumer needs serviced by fully automated and
connected smart machines, such that many of the rules of contract law
become irrelevant, what is the problem? Moreover, if technological
management performs better than the rules of environmental law in
controlling carbon emissions and the release of pollutants, what is the
problem? If technological management through geo-engineering is more
effective than rules in protecting the planetary boundaries, is that not a
decisive reason for employing it? That said, there might be some domains
and some respects where the use of rules is to be preferred.
First, as indicated above, because rules do not in practice reach right
through to compliance, there is a gap that might be productively exploited
by conscientious objectors and civil disobedients; and, even where there are,
as it were, straightforward acts of non-compliance, this can stimulate
reflection on the acceptability of the background rules. To this extent,
deviance is not entirely dysfunctional.
Secondly, we might be concerned that technological management stifles the
opportunity for desirable self-governance. Business people, unlike
consumers, might benefit from the opportunity to self-regulate their
markets and dealings. Some groups, too, might value having a space to
develop their own workable standards of neighbourliness and
reasonableness (for example as in Robert Ellickson’s seminal study of the
farmers and ranchers of Shasta County) (Ellickson, 1991).
Thirdly, we might doubt that technological management is capable of
reflecting the nuances that can be built into the drafting of rules (inviting
interpretation and, concomitantly, offering some space for discretionary
application that is responsive to the particular circumstances).
Fourthly, while rule-making can be inclusive and accessible, we might be
concerned that there is a risk that the use of technological management
excludes too many (non-technically expert) people who simply cannot
meaningfully participate in the process.
Finally, to the extent that rules are provisional, reviewable, and revisable
interventions, is there a risk that, in practice, measures of technological
management might be resistant to easy change or amendment?
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4. Conclusion
Technological management is not just another way of directing human
conduct; it is not just an alternative to prescribing rules. Digital rights
management is not just like saying to users ‘respect the IP rules’ or ‘comply
with the terms and conditions of your licence’; applying a technological fix
to a supermarket trolley or a golf cart is not just like saying ‘do not wheel
the trolley off site or take the cart onto the greens’; embedding privacy
protecting design in products is not just like saying ‘respect data protection
or privacy principles’, and so on. Focusing on technological prevention of
crime is not at all the same as responding ex post to a violation of the
criminal code. In each case, the use of technological management rather
than rules changes the complexion of the regulatory environment. Thus, it
is imperative that we ask whether its use is a legitimate exercise of power;
and, we urgently need to understand more about the ways in which
pervasive technological management will impact on the conditions of our
social existence.
If the cities of Europe are to be technologically sophisticated and smart,
then there needs to be a public discussion about the way in which the
relevant enabling technologies are embedded in our different environments,
at home, at work, at play, and so on. These are technologies with regulatory
effects, impacting on our health and safety as well as our culture and
values. There needs to be reflection on the regulatory role of these
technologies, alongside law and social norms, long before they are part of
our regulatory environments, not as an afterthought.
Now is the time to be asking these questions. Moreover, it is lawyers who
should be in the vanguard in formulating these questions. The Rule of Law
is too important to be left to politicians; and the conference in Amsterdam
represents a significant step in recognising that today’s technologies are
potentially disruptive for both legal practice and the way that we regulate
social life (see, further, Brownsword, Scotford and Yeung, 2017).
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Regulation by Platforms
The impact on fundamental rights
Orla Lynskey
Introduction
When John Perry Barlow penned the ‘Declaration of the Independence of
Cyberspace’1 it was governments, ‘weary giants of flesh and steel’, rather
than private actors that threatened to jeopardise emerging governance
structures in ‘cyberspace’. Twenty years later, the State increasingly
operates in tandem with online private actors in security and law
enforcement, in the provision of public goods and even to adjudicate what
is in the ‘public interest’.2 Digital platforms are key players in this picture.
While what constitutes a ‘digital platform’ is contested, a digital platform is
defined here as an ‘undertaking operating in two (or multi)-sided markets,
which uses the Internet to enable interactions between two or more distinct
but interdependent groups of users so as to generate value for at least one
of the groups’. 3 Digital platform is therefore a broad category
encompassing familiar services such as content-sharing site YouTube,
micro-blogging service Twitter, shopping site Amazon, and general and
specialized search services, such as Google and Skyscanner, amongst many
other others.
What is critical about a platform for the purpose of this paper is that it acts
as a type of digital middleman, intermediating the activities of individuals
in the digital sphere. Private platforms are already subject to various forms
© Orla Lynskey

Orla Lynskey is Assistant Professor in the Law Department of the London School
of Economics. She teaches and conducts research in the areas of data protection,
technology regulation, digital rights and EU law.
1
John Perry Barlow, ‘A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace’, 8
February 1996, available at https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence (all
links last accessed 8 March 2016).
2 This follows from the ECJ ruling in Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL v AEPD
(EU:C:2014:317). See further, Julia Powles, ‘The Case That Won’t be Forgotten’
[2015] Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 583.
3 European Commission, ‘Public Consultation on the regulatory environment for
platforms, online intermediaries, data and cloud computing and the collaborative
economy’, September 2015,
5. Available at:
https://ec.europa.eu/digitalagenda/en/news/public-consultation-regulatory-environment-platformsonlineintermediaries-data-and-cloud .
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of regulation: for instance, they are beneficiaries of private law rights, and
subject to private law liabilities.4 They also benefit from a presumption of
neutrality, which exempts them from liability, when they act as a ‘mere
conduit’ for content, or simply ‘cache’ or ‘host’ this content. 5 Thus, for
instance, a platform like Facebook will not be held liable for defamatory
content if it can demonstrate that it did not have actual or constructive
knowledge that the content it was hosting was defamatory, and that it
acted expeditiously to remove the content upon becoming aware of its
existence.6
However, in addition to this regulation of private online platforms, this
paper suggests that we are also regulated by private platforms and that this
‘private ordering’, facilitated by technological code, has implications for
economic, social, cultural and political dimensions of our lives.7 This paper
argues, in particular, that platforms influence the extent to which we can
exercise our rights, and the effectiveness of those rights, in a direct and
indirect way. These implications are exacerbated when the platform
concerned is in a position of power, for instance because of the number of
individuals that use the platform. This paper shall illustrate this point by
reference to two examples, and will then briefly identify some of the
options open to policy-makers to tackle these issues, and the challenges
they may face in so doing.
Regulation by platforms: the direct impact on the exercise of
fundamental rights
According to Article 10 ECHR, the freedom of expression includes the
freedom to ‘receive and impart information and ideas without interference’.
Powerful platforms, such as Facebook with its privileged access to 1.86

Mark A Lemley, ‘Terms of Use’ (2006) Minnesota Law Review 459 and Woodrow
Hartzog, ‘Website Design as Contract’ (2011) 60 American University Law Review
1635.
5 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June
2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic
commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce) [2000] OJ
L178/1.
6 E-Commerce Directive, Article 14. The application of this provision has, however,
not always been straightforward in practice. See, most recently, CG v Facebook [2016]
NICA 54.
7 Tarleton Gillespie, ‘Governance of and by platforms’ in Jean Burgess, Thomas
Poell, and Alice Marwick (eds) SAGE Handbook of Social Media (forthcoming). Prepublication
available
at:
http://culturedigitally.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/Gillespie-Governance-ofby-Platforms-PREPRINT.pdf .
4
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billion monthly active users 8 , control information flows, and shape the
relationship between users, on one side of the market, and providers of
information and content, on the other side of the market. The position of
these platforms as chokepoints, or gatekeepers9, in the digital information
sphere is implicit in the fact that they are co-opted by the State in order to
police certain content, for instance child abuse images.10 Thus, it is possible
to say that in the online world, platforms have primary responsibility for
enabling, or disabling, our access to and dissemination of information.
Indeed, this power has attracted considerable media attention following the
British referendum on Brexit and the election of Donald Trump in the US,
where the victors claim that political micro-targeting based on user data
was critical to their success at the ballot box. 11 Digital platforms also
determine the terms and conditions on which this access to information
and dissemination occurs. In practice therefore platforms determine the
extent to which individuals can enjoy the benefits of established rights and
freedoms, such as the right to freedom of expression. This power to include
or exclude certain content from a platform, or to rank it, is a significant
power. For instance, in its most recent annual report on Digital News
Oxford’s Reuters Institute reports that of the 50,000 individuals it surveyed
across 26 countries, 12% say social media is their main source of news
while in the US, for instance, the percentage of people who use social
media as a news source is now 46%, almost doubling since 2013.12 This
issue has gained prominence recently as a result of increased media and
political scrutiny of the role of platforms in disseminating ‘fake news’.13
Facebook, ‘Newsroom: Stats’. Available at http://newsroom.fb.com/companyinfo (all urls last accessed on 7 March 2017, unless otherwise stated).
9 Karine Barzilai-Nahon, ‘Toward a theory of network gatekeepeing: A framework
for exploring information control’ (2008) 59(9) Journal of the American Society for
Information Science and Technology 1493.
10 For instance, in the UK the Internet Watch Foundation helps the State to combat
the dissemination of child abuse images For further information on the activities of
the Internet Watch Foundation visit: https://www.iwf.org.uk/ .
11 See, BBC Panorama, ‘What Facebook Knows About You’, aired on 8 May 2017,
and Carole Cadwalladr, ‘The great British Brexit robbery: how our democracy was
hijacked’,
The
Observer,
7
May
2017.
Available
at:
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/07/the-great-britishbrexit-robbery-hijacked-democracy .
12 Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, ‘Reuters Institute Digital News
Report 2016’, 7 and 8:
http://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Digital%20News%20R
eport%202016.pdf .
13 House of Commons - Culture, Media and Sport Committee, ‘Fake news’ inquiry
(closed 3 March 2017) which queried, inter alia, whether ‘changes in the selling and
placing of advertising encouraged the growth of fake news, for example, by
making it profitable to use fake news to attract more hits to websites, and thus
8
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However, this power of platforms over opinion formation has always been
present.
Ranking in the search engine context is inevitable, as not all search results
can appear at the top of the results, or even on the first page. Nevertheless,
it appears that search is a ‘credence good’, and that users therefore trust
that the results that are produced in response to a search query, and the
order in which these results are produced, is based on objective criteria.
This results in what has been labelled a ‘search engine manipulation effect’
(SEME). 14 SEME does not suggest that search engines deliberately
manipulate individuals but rather that individuals fail to consider critically
the veracity of search results. Similarly, the suggestions offered by
‘autocomplete’ tools by platforms can influence individual perceptions. As
Mansell suggests, digital platforms also have the ‘power to ensure that
certain public impressions become permanent, while others remain
fleeting’.15 Consider the controversy in the UK when it was reported that
Google search engine’s failure to offer a suggested ‘autocomplete’ search
term when individuals entered the words ‘Conservatives are’ in the search
engine yet offered several autocomplete suggestions when terms relating to
rival political parties (for instance, ‘Labour are’) were entered into the
search engine.16 Google’s secret sauce – its ranking algorithm – is zealously
guarded as a commercial secret with Google revealing only that its
algorithm relies on 200 or so signals to glean the search intention of the user.
Relevant factors here certainly include geographic location, the ‘freshness’
of website content etc. 17 Critical attention has however focused on the
extent to which this ranking should, or can, be neutral.18
more
income
from
advertisers’.
https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commonsselect/culture-media-and-sport-committee/inquiries/parliament-2015/inquiry2/ .
14 Robert Epstein and Ronald E. Robertson, ‘The search engine manipulation effect
(SEME) and its possible impact on the outcomes of elections’ 2015(112)
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
(PNAS). Available at: http://www.pnas.org/content/112/33/E4512.abstract.
15 Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society – The Secret Algorithms that Control Money
and Information (Harvard University Press, 2015), 14.
16 The New Statesman, ‘Why doesn’t Google autocomplete “Conservatives are...”?’,
3
February
2016.
Available
at:
http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/media/2016/02/why-doesn-t-googleautocomplete-conservatives-are .
17 Google, ‘How Google Search Works’:
https://support.google.com/webmasters/answer/70897?hl=en .
18 For instance, the European Commission continues to investigate Google for an
alleged abuse of dominance on the grounds that it ‘systematically favours its
comparison shopping services in its search results pages’. The Commission
therefore appears to assume an obligation of non-discrimination on Google’s part.
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Platforms can also have a significant direct impact on freedom of
expression by blocking the route between individuals and providers.
Pasquale provides the example of Apple’s exclusion of the ‘Drone +’
application from its App Store.19 The Drone + application provided users
with real-time alerts of drone strikes reported in the media. In this way,
users of the application who wished to gain access to publicly available
information about under-reported military drone strikes could obtain it in a
user-friendly format. The application was rejected from the App Store
twice: first on the grounds that it was ‘not useful’ and subsequently on the
basis that it was ‘objectionable and crude’. 20 The exclusion of the
application is just one illustration of the way in which the actions of
gatekeepers can have an impact on opinion formation and the autonomy of
Internet users.21 It also illustrates that gatekeeper transparency is critical.22
It might be argued that other sources of this information remained
available, and that all editorial decision-making necessarily implies the
exclusion of some information. This is true. However, what is different in
this context is the role of Apple’s architecture (or code) in the decisionmaking context. Apple devices are automatically, and necessarily, routed
through the Apple App Store ‘walled garden’. 23 Apple’s choices are
See: Commission Press Release, ‘Commission takes further steps in investigations
alleging Google's comparison shopping and advertising-related practices breach
EU rules*’, 14 July 2016. For comment see: Angela Daly, ‘Dominating search:
Google before the law’ in Konig, Rene & Rasch, Miriam (Eds.) INC Reader #9
Society of the Query: Reflections on Web Search. Institute of Network Cultures
(Amsterdam, 2014) 86-104. Available at: http://networkcultures.org/query/wpcontent/uploads/sites/4/2014/06/7.Angela_Daly.pdf .
19 Pasquale, The Black Box Society (n 16) 62.
20 Pasquale, The Black Box Society (n 16) 62.
21 Competition lawyers reject the suggestion made by some authors that Google
could be likened to public utilities (such as rail or electricity providers) or essential
facilities. See, for instance, Marina Lao, ‘Search, Essential Facilities and the
Antitrust Duty to Deal’ (2013) Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual
Property 275.
22 The recent controversy following the ‘revelation’ that Facebook uses human
curators in order to shape the ‘Facebook trends’ feature also illustrates the opacity
of the operations of gatekeepers and the consequent lack of understanding of these
operations. See, Sam Thielman, ‘Facebook news selection is in hands of editors not
algorithms,
documents
show’,
The
Guardian,
12
May
2016
(https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/may/12/facebook-trendingnews-leaked-documents-editor-guidelines) or Deepa Seetharaman, ‘Facebook’s
Curators Shape ‘Trending’ News Feature’ Wall Street Journal, 12 May 2016
(http://www.wsj.com/articles/facebooks-curators-shape-trending-news-feature1463095472).
23 A ‘walled garden’ is a closed environment (for instance, an operating system)
where the operator controls access to the applications, content and services that
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therefore the choices of the user, and the user should be aware of the
factors informing Apple’s decisions to include and exclude
applications/products from its App Store. As Mansell suggests, ‘citizens
cannot choose to view what they are not aware of or to protest about the
absence of content which they cannot discover’.24
Regulation by platforms: the indirect impact on fundamental rights
Platforms may also have an indirect effect on fundamental rights as a result
of their position of power vis-à-vis content and service providers. In the
data protection and privacy context, this is evident when one considers the
role of platforms in setting the benchmark for data use conditions for all
providers wishing to distribute their content or services on the platform.
For instance, the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) noted that
operating systems (such as Google’s Android, or the Apple OS) are:
responsible for the Application Programming Interfaces (APIs)
which dictate how the software and hardware interact – including
what information the app can access. APIs control the release of
information according to the privacy controls in place at the
[operating system] level.25
The operating system platform therefore determines to what extent key
data protection principles are promoted. Reports suggest that platforms are
doing little to promote key data protection principles, such as data
minimisation,26 amongst application providers. For example, a 2014 survey
conducted by the Global Privacy Enforcement Network (GPEN) discovered
that one third of all applications requested an excessive number of
permissions to access additional personal information.27 Moreover, the US
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has taken actions against applications
such as Brightest Flashlight and Snapchat in recent years for
can be accessed. By only allowing approved apps into the Apple App Store, Apple
seeks to ensure better interoperability, synching and security however this closed
system may also limit user autonomy. Brian Meyer, ‘Why is iOS a Walled Garden?’,
Apple Gazette, 13 November 2013 (http://www.applegazette.com/opinion/whydoes-apple-hide-ios-in-a-walled-garden/).
24 Robin Mansell, ‘Platforms of power’ (2015) 43(1) Intermedia 20, 28.
25 CMA, ‘The commercial use of consumer data: Report on the CMA’s call for
information’, CMA38, June 2015, 42.
26 Article 6(1)(c) of the Data Protection Directive (European Parliament and Council
Directive 46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ
L281/23) states that personal data must be ‘not excessive in relation to the
purposes for which they are collected and/or further processed’.
27 CMA, ‘The commercial use of consumer data’ (n 26) 123.
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misrepresenting how the personal data they gather is used.28 This is not to
say that platforms are entirely inactive when it comes to promoting privacy
and data protection. For instance, recent reports suggest that Google Play –
the App store for Android users – culled applications from its platform on
the basis of privacy and data protection concerns. 29 However, their
ostensible ‘lowest common denominator’ approach to these rights
influences the extent to which these rights can be enjoyed their users.
Indeed, Google Play’s cull appeared only to remove egregious violators of
rights from the App store (for example, applications requesting sensitive
permissions – such as unnecessary data from cameras or microphones –
and that did not comply with the basic principles set out in the Play Store
privacy policy).
In addition to determining the terms on which applications can operate
(and process data), platforms can also demand that applications provide
them with access to customer data. For instance, it is well documented that
the Financial Times withdrew its application from the Apple App store
when it was forced to provide Apple with its consumer data. The news
provider went on to launch a Web-based version of its mobile app in a bid
to retain reader interest.30 Smaller news outlets have chosen not to provide
an app in a bid to retain custody of their user data.31
A complaint filed with the European Commission by the provider of a
privacy enhancing technology (PET) provides a further illustration of how
platforms can indirectly influence the extent to which individuals can
exercise their rights. Disconnect complained to the Commission that
Google had excluded one its applications from Android’s Google Play
application store thereby abusing its position of market power on the
market for mobile handset operating systems.32 Disconnect argued that the
exclusion of its application from the Google Play App store unfairly
discriminated against its application and gave Google’s own rival software
a competitive advantage. The Disconnect application in question prevents
CMA, ‘The commercial use of consumer data’ (n 26) 123-124.
Eric Abent, ‘Google Play prepares to remove apps over missing privacy policies’,
9 February 2017. Available at https://www.slashgear.com/google-play-preparesto-remove-apps-over-missing-privacy-policies-09474464/ .
30 Reuters, ‘Financial Times pulls its apps from Apple Store’, 31 August 2011
(http://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-ft-idUSTRE77U1O020110831).
31 Natali Helberger, Katharina Kleinen-von Königslöw and Rob van der Noll,
‘Regulating the new information intermediaries as gatekeepers of information
diversity’ 2015(17)(6) Info 50, 56.
32 Alistair Barr, ‘App Maker Files EU Complaint Against Google, Alleging Abuse of
Android
Dominance’,
1
June
2015.
Available
at:
http://www.wsj.com/articles/app-maker-files-eu-complaint-against-googlealleging-abuse-of-android-dominance-1433204706#:mdP9UIcFB3W9ZA .
28
29
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third parties from tracking Android users when they browse the web or
use applications on their devices. This tracking is used to gather data to
improve the targeting of advertising but can also facilitate the installation
of malware on devices. Google responded informally by highlighting that it
applies its policies consistently to all applications and that it has ‘long
prohibited apps that interfere with other apps – such as altering their
functionality, or removing their way of making money’. 33 It also
emphasised that there are over 200 privacy applications available in Google
Play that comply with its policies. This example again illustrates the
indirect impact that gatekeepers can have on the exercise of rights: by
blocking a PET – a technology designed to enhance privacy – a platform
can make it more cumbersome for an individual to exercise privacy and
data protection rights. While the impact on rights might be minimal given
the availability of competing PETs, again it highlights that in the absence of
an objective and transparently applied policy for the inclusion of
applications on a software platform, the platform can have an impact on
the rights of individuals.
Regulatory options for the road ahead
The examples set out above seek to illustrate that private platforms are
having a direct and an indirect influence on the extent to which individuals
can exercise their fundamental rights, and the effectiveness of these rights
in practice. Nevertheless, a regulatory ‘solution’ to deal with these
fundamental rights implications is not obvious.
The issue of ‘platform power’ has been the subject of increasing doctrinal34
and media attention.35 For instance, Cohen has argued that successful state
regulation of the information economy will, amongst other things, require
an ‘analytically sound conception of platform power’ and ‘coherent and
publicly accountable methods for identifying, describing and responding to
systemic threats’.36 ‘Platform power’ is also becoming a prominent feature
Foo Yun Chee, ‘Privacy app maker files EU antitrust complaint against Google’,
2 June 2015. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-google-antitrustidUSKBN0OI1Z220150602 .
34 See, most notably, Angela Daly, Private Power, Online Information Flows and EU
Law: Mind the Gap (Hart, 2016).
35 Joe Kennedy, ‘Don’t regulate internet platforms, embrace them’, 14 November
2015,
EurActiv
(http://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/opinion/don-tregulate-internet-platforms-embrace-them/); Tom Fairless, ‘EU Digital Chief Urges
Regulation to Nurture European Internet Platforms’, 14 April 2015, The Wall Street
Journal
(http://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-digital-chief-urges-regulation-tonurture-european-internet-platforms-1429009201).
36 Julie Cohen, ‘The Regulatory State in the Information Age’ (2016) 17(2)
Theoretical
Inquiries
in
Law
(forthcoming).
Available
at
33
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on public policy and regulatory agendas, particularly across Europe.37 The
European Union (EU) pinpointed this issue for further attention in a 2015
Communication setting out its strategy for a Digital Single Market for
Europe. It noted that:
Some online platforms have evolved to become players competing
in many sectors of the economy and the way they use their market
power raises a number of issues that warrant further analysis
beyond the application of competition law in specific cases.38
This marks a turning point as, to date, regulators have assumed that the
application of ex post competition law (or antitrust) rules, designed to
ensure that companies with market power will not exclude equally efficient
competitors or engage in exploitation, negates the need for the ex ante
regulation of platforms. Indeed, it is suggested that competition law is the
wrong tool to address these harms for several reasons. For instance, the
concept of power is ‘market power’ and is a term of art identified on the
basis of economic analysis of substitutability patterns. These tests do not
capture communications power, and thus markets that are experienced by
consumers as monopolistic (for instance, social networking services) may
not be classified as relevant markets or may be deemed competitive.
Perhaps more significantly, the harms that competition law seeks to
remedy are economic harms. This is manifest, for instance, through its
focus on consumer welfare. 39 However, the harms at stake here are

SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2714072. Cohen defines ‘platform power’ as the
‘power to link facially separate markets and/or to constrain participation in
markets by using technical protocols.’
37 Conseil National du Numerique (CNNum), ‘Platform Neutrality: Building an open
and
sustainable
digital
environment’,
May
2014
(available
at
http://www.cnnumerique.fr/wpcontent/uploads/2014/06/PlatformNeutrality_VA.pdf), 6. The French CNNum
acknowledge the ability of internet platforms ‘to create great value from the data
retrieved from users’, it also states that the use of this data must ensure respect for
the ‘data rights’ of users and that individuals ‘maintain sole control over the
repercussions resulting from the use thereof’ and ‘benefit from the use of their
data’. It concludes that ‘recent events have illustrated that current practices do not
make it possible to reach these goals.’
38 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council,
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions,
‘A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe’ COM (2015) 192 final, 12.
39 According to the European Commission in its Guidance on Article 102 TFEU
consumer welfare means that consumers ‘benefit from competition through lower
prices, better quality and a wider choice of new or improved goods and services’
(European Commission, Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in
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fundamental rights harms, with civic and social ramifications. This issue
should not therefore be viewed solely from a competition law perspective,
or from the lens of economic regulation. Indeed, it may be argued that by
facilitating further consolidations of power, without any regard for these
non-economic implications, competition law should rather be viewed as
part of the problem rather than part of the solution.40
This is not to say however that the task of regulating powerful platforms is
a necessary or an easy one. As a starting point, the harms outlined, even in
the context above, are relatively distinct – power over opinion formation;
encouraging low standards of data protection, leading to this de facto
reality; and, preventing the emergence of technologies that would facilitate
‘informational self-determination’ and data protection rights, yet harm the
bottom line of other application providers. It is thus clear that, if regulation
is appropriate to tackle these implications, a single overarching regulatory
framework is not the obvious solution. Moreover, as Cohen suggests, as
‘threatened future harms have become more abstract, diffuse, and
technologically complex, disputes about the appropriate regulatory
response have become struggles for control over the modelling and
representation of systemic threats and the burden of proof required to
justify regulatory action’41 It is also difficult to delimit the target of such
regulation: would it simply be ‘powerful’ platforms? This begs the question
of how we might identify, and delimit, these regulatory targets in an
objective way. While GAFA (Google-Amazon-Facebook-Apple) might
come to mind, it is immediately apparent that the operations of each is
distinct and thus may or may not have fundamental rights implications. A
harms-focused approach is thus potentially to be preferred, although this
may need to take into account the power differences between these
different platforms.
A further difficulty is that regulation would involve extending the logic of
fundamental rights to private operators. Rights can only be exercised vis-àvis public authorities, however the ECtHR has accepted that in some
circumstances a positive obligation exists for the State to protect this right.
For instance, in deciding whether such an obligation exists in the freedom
of expression context, several factors should be taken into account
including: the kind of expression at stake; the capability of that expression
to contribute to public debates; the nature and scope of the restrictions on
expression rights; the availability of alternative venues for expression; and,

applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant
undertakings OJ [2009] C 45/7, [5]).
40 Case COMP/M.7217, Facebook/Whatsapp, Commission Decision, [2014] OJ L24/1.
41 Cohen, ‘The Regulatory State in the Information Age’ (n 38) 17.
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the countervailing rights of others or of the public.42 Others, such as Jean
Thomas, have proposed models to enable the enforcement of these public
law rights vis-a-vis private actors, justifying this approach by emphasizing
the common objectives of descriptive, normative and constitutional
theories of rights and the gaps in rights protection that would ensue in the
absence of such an extension.43
Given these challenges in regulating, it may well be necessary to resort to
other non-legal ‘modalities of regulation’44, for instance norm changing or
technological fixes, in order to adjust to the influence that private platforms
are now having on fundamental rights.
.

Appleby and Others v. the United Kingdom,para [42]-[43] and [47]-[49].
Jean Thomas, Public Rights, Private Relations (OUP, 2015).
44 Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, Version 2.0 (Basic Books,
2006).
42
43
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Virtual Competition
The rise of unchallenged collusion
and discrimination?
Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke
1. Introduction
Technological developments in e-commerce, computers, Big Data, and
pricing algorithms, have changed the way we shop and communicate. In
reducing our reliance on local offerings, and increasing competition, they
have improved our welfare – with lower prices, better products and greater
choice. And yet, following the initial welfare gains, one may identify
increasing attempts by sellers and the super-platforms to ‘rebalance’ the
welfare equation and clawback some of the gains. Such harmful practices
include behavioural discrimination, price alignment and the superplatforms’ abuse of their gate keeper power to foreclose markets to
competition.
Interestingly, with the changing dynamics of online competition, some of
these practices -- despite their adverse effects on producers, consumers and
society -- may remain beyond the law’s reach. The effects and manifestation
of such practices is discussed in our recently published book, Virtual
Competition: The Promise and Perils of the Algorithm Driven Economy.1 In this
paper, we use two examples – tacit collusion and behavioural
discrimination – to illustrate the new potentially harmful dynamics of
online competition. Importantly, we recognize that Big Data and
technological innovations are neither good, bad, nor neutral: their nature
depends on how firms employ them, whether their incentives are aligned

© Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke

Ariel Ezrachi is the Slaughter and May Professor of Competition Law and a
Fellow of Pembroke College, Oxford. He serves as the Director of the University of
Oxford Centre for Competition Law and Policy.
Maurice E. Stucke is Professor of Law at the University of Tennessee and a Senior
Fellow at the American Antitrust Institute.
1 HUP, 2016. See:
http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674545472&content=review
s

29
Electroniccopy
copy available
available at:
Electronic
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3005914
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3005914

Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke

with our interests, and certain market characteristics.2 Our discussion does
not challenge the merit in further technological advancement, but rather
highlights the emergence of new anticompetitive strategies and the current
laws’ limitations.
2. Artificial Intelligence & Collusion
As companies increasingly rely on pricing algorithms and Big Data to price
goods, what are the implications on collusion? Technological developments
give rise to at least four categories of collusion, two of which may fall
outside the reach of most competition laws.
Take for example the ability to foster horizontal collusion through the use
of algorithms aimed at monitoring pricing and aligning their actions to
those of competitors. Today, the majority of retailers track online prices –
predominantly via automated software programmes developed for that
purpose – and, nearly 80% of those using such software consequently
adjust their own prices to those of their competitors (sometimes on an
automatic basis). 3 Manufacturers also have increased possibilities to
monitor deviations from "recommended" retail prices, with software being
capable of reporting (sometimes with immediate alerts) on how much
prices diverge from the recommended retail prices, or another reference
price used, and for how long.
Multiple firms may unilaterally use the computer as part of a subtler
strategy to enhance market transparency and predict behaviour. The
endemic use of similar (or identical) algorithms can transform the previous
competitive market to new market conditions, which owing to the
similarity of the algorithms and greater transparency, enable conscious
parallelism and higher prices. Computers can rapidly police deviations,
and calculate the profit implications of myriad moves and counter-moves
to punish deviations. 4 The speed of calculated responses effectively
deprives discounting rivals of any significant sales. The speed also means
that collusion can be signalled in a matter of seconds. The greater the
improbability that the first-mover will benefit from its discounting, the
greater the likelihood of tacit collusion.
The stability needed for tacit collusion is further enhanced by the fact that
computer algorithms are unlikely to exhibit human biases. Although
https://hbr.org/2016/10/how-pricing-bots-could-form-cartels-and-make-thingsmore-expensive
3 European Commission Staff Working Document Preliminary Report on the Ecommerce Sector Inquiry, SWD(2016) 312 final (2016), at 8.
4 http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/when-bots-collude
2
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human biases may be reflected in the programming code, biases will not
affect decisions on a case-by-case basis: a computer does not fear detection
and possible financial penalties or incarceration; nor does it respond in
anger.5
Importantly, when such actions are the result of unilateral strategy, they
would often escape the scrutiny of competition provisions. This is so as the
use of algorithm to monitor price will not often amount to an illegal
agreement or concerted practice. Indeed, in such case the firms have not
jointly agreed to anything, nor have the computers “agreed” as
conventionally understood to fix prices. The removal of the legal concept of
agreement restricts the range of enforcement tools.
As Lord David Currie of the U.K. Competition and Markets Authority
observed, “the rise of the algorithmic economy raises potentially difficult
questions for competition policy”:
Algorithms can provide a very effective way of almost
instantly coordinating behaviour, possibly in an anticompetitive way. Where algorithms are designed by humans
to do so, this is merely a new form of the old practice of
price-fixing. But machine learning means that the algorithms
may themselves learn that co-ordination is the best way to
maximise longer-term business objectives. In that case, no
human agent has planned the co-ordination. Does that
represent a breach of competition law? Does the law stretch
to cover sins of omission as well as sins of commission: the
failure to build in sufficient constraints on algorithmic
behaviour to ensure that the algorithm does not learn to
adopt anti-competitive outcomes? And what if constraints
are built in but they are inadequately designed, so that the
very clever algorithm learns a way through the constraints?
How far can the concept of human agency be stretched to
cover these sorts of issues? I have suggested earlier that the
competition tools at our disposal can tackle the competition
issues that we face in the new digital world, but perhaps this
last issue which I have touched on is one where this
proposition is not true.6

https://hbr.org/2016/10/how-pricing-bots-could-form-cartels-and-make-thingsmore-expensive
6 http://www.wiredgov.net/wg/news.nsf/articles/David+Currie+on+the+role+of+competition+in+st
imulating+innovation+03022017141532?open
5
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Lord Currie recognized that the EU and US enforcers currently cannot
tackle this last scenario. Based on our discussions with enforcers, lawyers
and economists, the emerging consensus is that the current legality under
competition law, however, should not mask the policy question of whether
such practices, when implemented by smart machines in a predictable
digitalised environment, ought to be condemned. With the ability to rely on
advanced algorithms to change the market dynamics and the possibility to
use artificial intelligence to perfect the strategy, could competition law
enforcers effectively identify and target such strategies? If so, should they?
3. The Rise of Behavioural Discrimination
While enforcers, lawyers and economists uniformly condemn collusion,
there is greater disagreement over behavioral discrimination. We are
already familiar with third-degree price discrimination, which involves the
charging of different prices to different groups. The price can depend,
among other things, on your age or reference group – such as students.
These practices, which are commonly regarded as efficient, are typically
permitted under the competition rules. And yet, new, advanced forms of
price discrimination may emerge in the online environment, and may
justify consideration of the scope and effectiveness of current enforcement
policies.
One distinct feature of behavioural discrimination is the shift to perfect, or
first-degree, price discrimination -- where firms can identify and charge for
every individual their reservation price. Outside of a few markets (like
tuition of highly selective private universities in the U.S.), this is rarely
feasible in the brick-and-mortar world.
But near-perfect price
discrimination may eventually be within reach in our online environment.
Many refined forms of price discrimination, involving different pricing on
mobile platforms and PCs, personalized search results, personalized
coupons, and price steering, are already appearing in the online
marketplace. Online platforms and sellers may employ sophisticated
strategies to further divide us into even smaller groups to better
approximate our reservation price.
Our anonymity and ability to identify a single competitive price are
becoming a thing of the past. The more we buy online, the more time we
spend online, and the more firms track us on- and off-line, then the more
data the firms collect about us, and the better they can categorize us with
other similar purchasers. To better train their algorithms and categorize us
into even smaller groups of individuals, firms will need personal data. The
rise of digital personal assistants will provide this data, including insights
on our preferences, habits, and weaknesses. The avalanche of data from our
homes, driverless cars, smartwatches, and smartphones will enable the
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super-platforms (which collect or process the bulk of personal data) to
better segment us into smaller groups. As we increasingly rely on our
digital personal assistant and other smart technologies, the algorithms will
have more opportunities to observe and predict our individual behaviour
and learn when they predict wrongly. The more times the algorithms can
observe what you and others within your group do under various
circumstances; the more it can learn through trial and error what your
group’s reservation price is under different situations; and, the more it can
recalibrate and refine (including shifting you to another group).7
Shifting the Demand Curve to the Right
Besides approaching near-perfect price discrimination, behavioural
discrimination has a second distinct feature, namely sellers using our
personal data to induce us to buy more products or services than we
otherwise would have purchased.
Most of us are not rational, self-interested individuals with willpower: we
have cognitive biases which diverge from assumed rationality and
moments when our willpower is weaker. Firms can exploit these
opportunities to induce us to buy things we may not have thought we
needed. All of us – at some time – have experienced buyer’s remorse.
Indeed, policymakers have recognized that some types of sellers – namely
those going door-to-door – are particularly good in getting people to buy
things they later realize they don’t need.8 Now imagine a salesperson who
knows your preferences, income, likes and dislikes, and weaknesses, and
personalizes his sales pitch to strike the right emotional appeal. Except, this
salesperson will unlikely ring your doorbell. It already is in your home
(namely your digital personal assistant or computer) or pocket (your smart
phone).

For example, an increase in the number of searches attempted on a search engine
increases the search engine’s likelihood of identifying relevant results and
predicting consumer preferences. Naturally, the quality improvement attracts
additional consumers to that search engine compared to competitor sites. The more
users, the larger (and more heterogeneous) the sample size, and the better the
search engine can identify relevant responses for both popular and less frequent
queries. For more on data-driven network effects, see Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P.
Grunes, Big Data and Competition Policy (Oxford University Press 2016).
8 The U.S. Federal Trade Commission’s Cooling-Off Rule, for examples, gives you
“a 3-day right to cancel a sale made at your home, workplace or dormitory, or at a
seller’s temporary location, like a hotel or motel room, convention center,
fairground or restaurant.” https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0176-buyersremorse-when-ftcs-cooling-rule-may-help.
7
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There are myriad biases for firms to exploit. One U.S. official observed
lenders’ incentives to exploit biases that lead consumers to over-borrow.9
Financial providers also “have incentives to charge fees that are less salient
for consumers or that take advantage of consumers' errors in predicting
their own future product usage--such as late fees, over-the-limit fees, and
overdraft fees.”10 Online sellers can add an expensive (albeit inferior) choice,
to encourage consumers to opt for a second choice that, whilst being more
expensive than the item that the consumer originally intended to purchase,
was relatively more attractive than the personalized decoy option. Online
firms may use price steering: Depending on the information they collect
about consumers, they can restrict the products that are displayed to a
particular consumer or vary the order of the listings to prioritise certain
products. For example, the travel website Orbitz steered Mac OS X users
toward “more expensive hotels in select locations by placing them at higher
ranks in search results.”11 Firms can deliberately increase complexity (by
adding price and quality parameters) to exploit consumers’ difficulty in
processing many complex options. Also, consider the fact of imperfect
willpower: consumers with limited patience will often pay a higher price.
Thus, the more the online site can encourage impulse purchases (such as
“scarcity marketing”), the less likely the consumer will comparison shop
and search for outside options.
The Durability of Behavioural Discrimination
Of course, the power to engage in behavioural discrimination at times is
limited. A market may emerge in which countermeasures develop for
individuals to outsmart price algorithms and trigger discounts or lower
prices by migrating between groups or thwarting their segmentation. It will
depend on, among other things, the competitors’ incentives, including their
data advantage over rivals, ability to harvest and process data, economies
of scale, and network effects. Here we may see how the four Vs of Big Data
– volume, variety, velocity and value – and data-driven network effects can
enable, under the right market conditions, big firms to become bigger, until
they dominate the market.12 In this environment, behaviour discrimination
may be more durable than one might initially predict.
Remarks by U.S. Assistant Sec'y for Fin. Institutions Michael S. Barr, Treas. TG961 (Nov. 18, 2010).
10 Ibid; see also Max Huffman & Daniel B. Heidtke, Behavioral Exploitation
Antitrust in Consumer Subprime Mortgage Lending, 4 Wm. & Mary Pol'y Rev. 77,
78 (2012).
11 Hannak et al., “Measuring Price Discrimination and Steering on E-Commerce
Web Sites” (n 14 above).
12 Search results, for example, can improve from the variety of personal data on
users. If people use other services offered by the search engine company (such as e9
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Customer outrage and backlash may also limit the incentive to discriminate.
To shroud the discrimination (and lessen the likely consumer outrage),
online sellers will likely start with a higher list price, and then selectively
vary the level or size of discounts: the less price-sensitive customers may
not care as much if others are getting promotional codes, coupons, and so
on, as long as the list price does not increase. Online sellers will
increasingly offer consumers with a lower reservation price a timely
coupon—ostensibly for being a valued customer, a new customer, a
returning customer, or a customer who won the discount. The coupon may
appear randomly assigned, but only customers with a lower reservation
price are targeted.
Another way to frame behavioural discrimination in a palatable manner is
to ascribe the pricing deviations to shifting market forces. Few people pay
the same price for airfare, hotel rooms, or corporate stock. They accept that
the pricing differences are responsive to market changes in supply and
demand (dynamic pricing) rather than price discrimination (differential
pricing). So, once consumers accept that prices change rapidly, they have
lower expectations of price uniformity among competitors. One hotel may
be charging a higher price because of its supply of rooms (rather than
discriminating against that particular user); rarely will people
simultaneously search on the same website for the same room and
communicate their findings. Thus, we may not know when pricing is
dynamic, discriminatory, or both. Indeed, we cannot easily distinguish a
discriminatory price from a dynamic price. A trend therefore may emerge
of eliminating list prices.13 Soon, as with airlines and hotels, pricing will be
dynamic—as the price offered yesterday or this morning may differ from
that offered today or tomorrow. With coupons added to the mix, a
competitive “benchmark” price will disappear, and price and behavioural
discrimination eventually may be accepted as the new normal. To the
extent that there is a market price, as personalized offerings increase, search
costs will also increase for consumers seeking to identify this “true” market
price.
mail, web-browser, texting, mapping, purchasing, etc.), the company, in collecting
the variety of personal data, can develop user profiles to better predict individual
users’ tastes and interests, and better target users with more relevant organic and
sponsored search results. See, also, https://www.wired.com/2016/11/subtleways-digital-assistant-might-manipulate; M.E. Stucke & A Ezrachi, When
Competition Fails to Optimize Quality: A Look at Search Engines, 18 YALE
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 70 (2016).
13
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/04/business/amazon-is-quietlyeliminating-list-prices.html?smprod=nytcore-iphone&smid=nytcore-iphoneshare&_r=0.
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The significant profits from behavioural discrimination will likely entice
firms with more users, more personal data, and better algorithms to
discriminate. Such firms can profit by consequently improving their selflearning algorithms, by capturing greater value from the data (either
through advertising-related services or behavioural discrimination), and by
using the profits from the discrimination to further enhance these
capabilities, making the whole process self-supporting.
The Welfare Effects of Behavioural Discrimination
So, what is behavioural discrimination’s net effect on welfare? Should
behavioural discrimination remain outside the realm of competition law?
In our presentations to competition officials, lawyers, economists and
scholars in the U.S. and E.U., some economists and lawyers were agnostic
while others were highly critical of behavioral discrimination. Indeed,
debates, at times, broke out among the audience members over the welfare
and fairness concerns of behavioral discrimination.
Behavioural discrimination amplifies many of the welfare effects associated
with price discrimination. By increasing output, it could increase access,
choice and efficiencies, thereby increasing overall welfare.
More often, however, behavioural discrimination would likely reduce
overall welfare. In gathering information about our behaviour, desires, and
ability to pay, sellers can manipulate our environment to increase overall
consumption, without necessarily increasing our welfare. Moreover,
behavioural discrimination may blur into actual discrimination due to the
limits and costs of refined aggregation. When the algorithm cannot access
sufficiently detailed information, consumers will be lumped into groups. If
you live in a certain neighbourhood, are a certain age, went to a certain
university, or are a member of a particular religion, then the pricing
algorithm may place you in a particular category. The seller’s algorithm
estimates that certain groups are more likely to buy the product and are
less sensitive to its price than other groups.
The new paradigm of behavioural discrimination affects not only our
pocketbook but our social environment, trust in firms and the marketplace,
personal autonomy, privacy and well-being. Once one accounts the
consumer perspective, the social welfare perspective, and the limited
likelihood of total welfare increasing, behavioural discrimination is likely a
toxic combination.
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Conclusion
The Internet, Big Data and Big Analytics -- in reducing entry barriers,
search costs, and transaction costs -- can increase the number of sellers; in
increasing productive efficiencies, market transparency, and availability of
information, they can promote competition.
It is, however, important to note that the current online markets are far
from perfect competition. The invisible hand that we rely upon can be
pushed aside by the “digitized hand.” The digitized hand has the capacity
to be selective and generate different levels of competitive pressures on the
players. The resulting environment operates with rules different from the
ones we assume in the theoretical economic models, and can yield new
forms of anticompetitive behavior that reduce our welfare.
As we explore in Virtual Competition, the current enforcement toolbox may
be limited in effectively deterring some practices, such as algorithm-driven
tacit collusion and behavioural discrimination. In addition, the enforcers
may find intervention in these instances to be overly challenging.14 The
challenges of virtual competition require us to carefully study the new
dynamics of competition and explore means to safeguard our welfare while
sustaining a competitive market environment.

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/dec/04/how-do-youthrow-book-at-an-algorithm-internet-big-data
14
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Uncertainty in EU Technology
Regulation: How law making and
law enforcing matters
Indra Spiecker genannt Döhmann
A. Introduction
We live in world of uncertainty and risk. One of the reasons for it is the
technological development and its consequences. This is particularly true
for Information Technology (IT): We do not know where the development
of autonomous robots, of ubiquitous computing, of big data evaluations or
of industry 4.0 will lead and how much society, economy, democracy or
collective decisions as we know them will change.
This uncertainty is not restricted to the technology itself. We do not know
the future as such: Where does a new technology lead to? How does it
develop? Which problems will arise? Will chances, will risks be fulfilled?
Questions like these reflect the sociological and technical-scientific
uncertainty. But uncertainty also exists in regard to the addressees of
regulation and in regard to the regulators themselves: How to test and
monitor? How to evaluate the unknown and the insecure? Shall innovative
approaches be furthered or rather the development slowed? How to
prevent risks to turn into dangers for humans and environment, for this
and for the next generation(s)?
Evolving technologies have always been the goal and the reason for
regulation. The fear of unknown risks has had technology regulation center
© Indra Spiecker genannt Döhmann
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public and administrative law, information law, environmental law and legal
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around the principle of precaution. This well-known principle can be
described as allowing stronger modes of regulation and further
infringements of individual rights under conditions of uncertainty than
under conditions of certainty/near-certainty: If severe risks are feared from
a new technology without clear knowledge about these risks, states may
intervene with the further unrestricted development of this technology even to the amount of forbidding it completely. This is rarely the case, but
e.g. in cloning, stem cell research or in preimplantation diagnosis one can
observe such complete bans. As a thumb-rule, the precautionary principle
allows further reaching infringements the more severe and irreparable
damages are considered. However, such considerations do not necessarily
rely on scientific evidence - often, the precautionary principle is applied
where scientific evidence is non-existent or inconclusive.
The principle of precaution, however, is only one of several means how
legal regulation can influence the development of technology. The
following paper first shortly establishes the general legal approach to
uncertainty (B.). It then explores how technology influences law and how
law influences technology in law setting (C.) as well as in law enforcement
(D.). It discusses how law and technology can interact in creating an
efficient enforcement of law. Conclusion and outlook (E.) follow. It refers in
its examples to European law if possible, but will make use of the rich
German scientific discussions when analyzing fundamental issues.
The following paper is based on the general assumption that technology
and law are two different systems with two different rationalities and two
different languages and thus collisions and frictions are inevitable. The
system of law functions under the code of lawful versus unlawful, i.e. legal
versus illegal while the system of technology functions according to the
code of technically possible versus not possible. Thus, we observe law as a
normative system and technology as a non-normative system.
B. Legal Decisions under Conditions of Uncertainty
Law and legal science have long ignored uncertainty. To a considerable
extent, that still holds true. Court proceedings are heavily occupied with
finding facts and establishing them; rulings take a particular factual
situation as given. Administrative agencies regulate companies on the basis
of assumed probabilities: Whether or not and to which extent an emission
assists in air pollution or is consumed is unclear, but the law acts as if the
amount and the effect of pollution was set. Regulatory agencies issue rules
at market participants in net economies such as energy or
telecommunications although it is not certain whether their conduct indeed
contributes to market failure. Legislators require producers to generally
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refrain from using certain substances under the EU’s REACh regulation1
although it is unclear whether these substances indeed cause health
problems.
One of the reasons for this can be seen in the established system of
balancing of and the division of power. In order for effective control to take
place, in the end it is courts who have to decide whether to judge the
present situation - including facts and developments that have become
known since the decision of legislation or administration - or whether to
base their judgment on the facts as they were known at the time of the
original decision. Whether or not the ex ante or the ex post situation
matters, is heavily disputed and has been answered quite differently
depending on the different legal field. In the first time frame, courts
become additional legislators bound by an objective viewpoint to the law;
in the second time frame, courts have to let decisions pass that could not be
passed under the current status of knowledge. Which time frame is decisive,
of course, influences the decision making process as such: Whether or not
redress is to be feared becomes an important factor for the decider. This, in
the end, makes deciders and courts prone to creating and acting upon a
certainty often not present. Additionally, another reason can be directly
named. One of the core values of law is the establishment of predictability,
of legal certainty and of accountability. Thus, legal decisions must redefine
the unknown und construe certainty for its constituents and addressees. So
it is immanent that law avoids continuous uncertainty.
The reasons for uncertainty are manifold. Most of them are connected to
the lack of knowledge about the future as such2 or to the lack of secure and
certain knowledge. Often, it is unknown how addressees of regulation will
act, whether the market will develop in a certain way or whether a
substance causes cancer, indeed. Total lack of knowledge and uncertain
knowledge are, however, often only divided by a thin line. Missing
knowledge can only be described, understood and interpreted if sufficient
information is present to detect it. The more this information is precise and
conclusive, the more uncertainty can be reconstructed and reduced to a
manageable level.
This raises the question of how to deal with uncertainty in general. The
most commonly used instrument is that of gathering and processing (new)
information. This sounds intuitive: The decider searches for sources of
information to identify his missing knowledge, to reformulate existing
knowledge and to conclude a picture of the world on which to base her
2006/1907/EC.
Uncertainty also exists in regard to past information; this is typically the case in
court proceedings where liability for a past incident needs to be established.
1
2
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decision.3 Thus, information gathering aims at ending or at least at limiting
uncertainty to a degree that future developments are predictable and
decision can be based on that prediction.4
The process of information gathering opens the legal system to other
systems, especially the technological system: Legal decisions need the
technological factual basis to ground their normative standards. However,
we find little restriction and little guidance for legislation, administration
and judicative how to integrate such non-legal knowledge. Why would one
statistical value be better than another statistical value to base the
prediction about emissions on? It is frequently stated that legal decision
makers may not take up the technological assessment directly but have to
judge it by themselves even to the extent that they may detach themselves
from the technological facts.5 This, however, leaves ample room for the
exact degree of guidance for the legal system by the technological system.
Deciding requires, however, more than effective information gathering; it
needs integrated and understood information i.e. knowledge. And
decisions under conditions of uncertainty need to deal with the fact that
there is often not sufficient and/or not certain information, but that the
decision has to be taken anyhow e.g. because of time restraints or because
of political and legal pressure. If a company develops an energy plant,
there is not time enough to wait for similar plants’ experiences about the
changes in air pollution, ground storage of substances and effects on the
environment. These information will not be present in due time. Waiting
would violate the rights of the company, but deciding may also violate
rights of citizens and neighbors sometime in the future.
When analyzing existing technology regulation law, one finds mostly a
procedural approach how to deal and how to control for decisions under
uncertainty. Extended rules on how information is gathered, which
stakeholders are to be involved, whose interests are legally weighted are
typical. The Environmental Impact Assessment Directive 6 requires
European member states to integrate an extensive process into their
decision making with the major goal of identifying the right amount of
information in environmental decisions. We are also familiar with
For the purposes of this paper it is neglected that information also needs to be
understood correctly and integrated into the decision process.
4 It will only be mentioned in this footnote that the search for new information may
also cause new uncertainty by challenging existing facts and convictions.
5 Cp.
Seidel, Privater Sachverstand und staatliche Garantenstellung im
Verwaltungsrecht, 2000; P. Scholl, Der private Sachverständige im
Verwaltungsrecht, 2005; S. Tönsmeyer-Uzuner, Expertensysteme in der öffentlichen
Verwaltung, 2000.
6 2011/92/EU.
3
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considerable regulation on the gathering of information: It has to be
complete, neutral, balanced and include alternative positions to name just
the most prominent descriptions.
As examples, this can be observed in two quite different regulatory
approaches on the EU level: In chemistry regulation, the REACH regulation
sets extensive and demanding rules for information: The entire registration
process concentrates on requiring producers and users to detect and share
information that would otherwise not be available. In a similar way, the
new EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) institutionalizes a risk
assessment procedure. It requires companies to inform regulatory
authorities about potentially dangerous data processing activities. The
rules on how to judge these activities, however, in the face of uncertainty,
are general and derive from the same normative standards as are applied
for certainty.
This illustrates that there exist few substantive rules for weighing
alternative or uncertain information and for judging new technology and
its uncertain effects. Legislation formulates goals of regulation, but they in
general give very little guidance to the level of restrictedness
administration should apply and for what reason. There is no clear concept
how to weigh uncertainty and how to act under these conditions.
Thus, obviously, the general approach to decisions under uncertainty is to
delegate it to the administrative level and to hand down procedural
standards, among them those for the gathering of information. However,
we rarely observe standards for weighing uncertain information. It is a
most difficult process: Shall it be interpreted towards the risks or towards
the chances, shall it be looked at from a worst-case-scenario or rather from
a low-risk perspective?
C. Law and Technology under Conditions of Uncertainty in Law
Making
It is this question, the legislature is principally confronted with in decisions
of uncertainty. And the legislature’s prime task is to set a general
framework for the individualized decisions of the administration. Thus, the
legislature is required to decide this question and thus reduce uncertainty
for the administration.7
This process is a very complicated one that cannot be explained further within the
restraints of this paper. The division of power between legislation and
administration leaves ample room to pass on a certain amount of uncertainty to the
level of administration.
7
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It is mainly left to the task of the legislature to balance the rights that stand
behind different interpretations. In general, this is the correct approach.
However, looking for constitutional guidance, one cannot find clear
standards. Individual rights neither request complete protection from
technological, economic or environmental risks nor do they allow for
unrestricted use of chances.
We do not find much of a procedural approach, either: Legislators in
Europe (and the US) have very little constitutional obligations in regard to
the collection and processing of information within their legislative
framework. This is also due to constitutional settings that follow different
goals than potential control of decisions under uncertainty: Independence
of parliamentary representatives and the representation of the free will of
the sovereign people are not very consistent with restrictions on
information gathering and processing.
Thus, decision making under uncertainty remains widely open to the
legislators’ political interests with very little control possible.8
D. Law and Technology under Conditions of Uncertainty in Law
Enforcement
For administration, uncertainty takes place in individual cases, i.e. in
enforcement of the legislator’s will formulated in the legal norm. Here,
uncertainty is often not restricted to technological uncertainty only, but
often includes legal uncertainty. Moreso, legal decisions by legislation often
create legal uncertainty for the administration.
There are two different legal uncertainty scenarios this paper looks into a
bit further from the viewpoint of the interaction between law and
technology: Either, in the first case, the legislative approach to uncertainty
itself leads to misunderstanding on the side of the addressees with regard
to what is expected of them; or, in the second case, the addressees misjudge
whether and to what extend rules have to be followed. The uncertainty on
the side of the addressees is directly linked to the uncertainty of the
administration.

Germany’s Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) has established a
duty of the legislation to control for significant changes on the factual basis of
decisions under uncertainty (duty to amend), e.g. BVerfGE 56, 54. This, however, is
interpreted very lightly, and actual restrictions for the legislation are hard to detect.
8
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In the first case, the normative value of legislation remains unclear in the
face of technological changes. The executive has to fill this void without
clear guidance on how to interpret technology’s advances. This is typical
for the friction between the two systems of law and of technology.
Possible is also that multiple interpretations in parallel (independent)
administrative institutions exist, for example if several agencies decide on
similar cases but do so differently or if addressees have a choice between
several agencies. This latter problem then stems from an unclear division of
power, competition between institutions’ interests and/or restricted
capacities of the institutions to learn and integrate other institutions’
positions. This allows for strategic reactions by the addressees similar to the
concept of forum shopping known well from international law. It may also
lead to a race to the bottom how to construct the legislator’s will to attract
technology companies rather than follow the original goals of the
legislation.
For administrative agencies, it is very difficult to handle legal uncertainty
by themselves; often they have to wait for courts to establish a clarified and
a unified approach to unclear legislation. Legislation’s potential reactions to
the creation of legal uncertainty include setting clear normative standards
in the first place, but also a clear solution to institutional competition:
Consolidation measures between different institutions, hierarchy or even
the dissolution of institutions help solve this problem.
In REACH, the EU has established one common EU agency (ECHA)
supporting the EU-wide authorization procedure for chemicals. This, of
course, has a price: One is the loss of informational variety; another is the
loss of sovereignty for the member states. And finally, it has impacts on the
general culture of the EU. The GDPR choses a different way: It establishes a
complex consolidation procedure between the independent national
regulatory agencies. Here, too, downsides lure, among them the amount of
time needed for such a complex decision process or the opening of the
regulatory process to strategic behavior of the agencies.
A second reason for legal uncertainty in technology regulation can be that
addressees misjudge whether and to what extend legal norms have to be
followed. This is often the case if enforcement has been lax or if sanctions
are low: as compliance is costly, addressees rationally refrain from
adhering to the law based on a cost-benefit-analysis.
Behind this reason one can often find a reluctancy of regulatory agencies to
enforce, e.g. because of unclear legislative rules or because of fear of being
overturned by courts. Not to be underestimated is another source of lack of
enforcement: the lack of resources of a regulatory agency. This includes not
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only manpower and financial resources, but - often underestimated - also
the resource of technological knowledge. Often, regulators know
considerably less than the regulatory addressees, and thus they refrain
from decisions. This holds particularly true in small technology markets
with highly specialized knowledge. Here, a “cartel of silence” that excludes
regulators can effectively hinder regulatory action.
Potential solutions by the administration itself are, again, difficult to obtain.
It is the legislation that can solve or at least diminish these problems. One
way can be a “means-to-an-end”/final regulation where the legislator does
not describe individualized measures which need highly specialized
knowledge for control. Rather, a certain goal is set, and it is left to the
addressees to choose fitting instruments to reach it. Administrative law
ignores technology in this instrument: enforcement is restricted to the
control of the goal reached. This also has the advantage that addressees are
left a considerable amount of freedom in the choice of their means. This
instrument constitutes, by the way, one of the very few substantive
handlings of uncertainty.9
A different way would be a regulation of the means how to reach a certain
goal, thus requiring addressees to follow an exactly defined process. Such a
procedural approach usually requires knowledge of the technology on the
side of legislation but even more so on the side of the administration: In
order to control whether the process has been followed, the administration
needs to make use of specific technology related knowledge. As an
example: REACH requires producers and distributors of substances to
undergo an exactly defined testing procedure to assure non-carcinogenous
effects.
Another solution rarely mentioned would be an integrative approach by
technology and law combined. It would require technology to change its
code of functioning from the code of “technically possible - technically
impossible” to a more normative code of “technically desirable undesirable”. Thus, technology itself would enforce its new code by itself.
If this sounds like an impossible instrument, one should consider that
technology has often accepted another discipline’s - normative - code
before. It is most prominent in regard to the economic code. Technology
develops according to market regimes: A technology without subscribers or
consumers is not further invested in, and so it is not developed further often, until it is forgotten. Also, law has often changed technology’s code
On the other hand, this does not solve the problem how to set this goal which
leads us back into section C: Law and Technology under conditions of uncertainty
in Law Making.
9
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before: Illegal practices have gained wide attention and consequently, the
technology has mostly not been continued.10
That it is feasible can be illustrated by the so-called “privacy-by-design”approach in information and communications technology which has even
been prominently placed in the new EU General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) e.g. in Art. 24 (1) and Art. 25. Data protection
requirements have to be internalized into the development of data
processing. The goal is to avoid data protection violations because of the
technological setting. Thus, the legal standards influence the technological
setting. A famous example of this is the opt-in versus opt-out approach.
E. Conclusion and Outlook
Law and technology operate on different codes. This makes frictions not
only likely but inevitable. Technology challenges the law: It creates
competitive standards and can even be interpreted to introduce different
concepts of normativity. Overall, the immanent dynamics of technology
creates a constant need for law to test its normative standards and its
instruments in the face of uncertainty. But law also shapes technology, e.g.
by permitting or forbidding certain uses thus influencing technology
development and the markets for technology.
Any type of law setting for the use of technology is only as effective as its
enforcement. However, the effectiveness of enforcement depends on the
clarity and the instruments used by legislation. The amount of information
and of certainty shape the level of enforcement. However, without effective
enforcement the governance function of law remains an empty shell.
Uncertainty thus challenges one of the core functions of law.
Legal Solutions can integrate technology, and they can shape technology
development. Concepts such as privacy-by-design can even combine both
systems to a certain extent. But there will always be a continuous
interdependency and friction between the two independent systems of
technology and law.

Here, one can observe the interaction between three different codes: The verdict
of law of a certain technology to be forbidden and illegal has closed the market for
the technology and thus the technology has vanished.
10
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On a need to have basis
The innovation principle, the
rule of law, and EU regulation of
new technologies?
Geert van Calster, Kathleen Garnett, Leonie Reins
The “Innovation Principle” is frequently cited in recent EU policy
documents. Yet it remains undefined. It has been suggested the principle is
not stand alone but rather integrated with EU efforts in areas such as
smarter regulation, innovation, and the circular economy. How exactly
innovation will twin with these various efforts, will determine how the EU
balances technological development and competitiveness, with public
interests such as environmental and public health protection.
Our research in this area starts from a simple observation. On the one hand
the EU’s circular economy efforts, its prioritisation of Limits to Growth etc.
imply that it is not because we can produce something that we should. On
the other, it is imperative that the EU remain competitive in a globalized
world based on global value chains.
We suggest that one potential answer, which to date has not been
considered, may be the adoption of a “public needs analysis” for
technological innovations: Regulating on the basis of whether a new, untested
technology is needed. In regulating new technologies, the EU so far have
focussed on addressing what might be public health risks. On a good day,
we have also contemplated environmental protection. What though would
happen if we were to regulate on a ‘need to have’ basis? Is there a
possibility to devise a regulatory regime which weeds out B2C products in
© Geert van Calster, Kathleen Garnett, Leonie Reins
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particular which grant little true advance? Are there examples of needsbased regulation which could guide us in this respect? Can a regulatory
regime offer selection without offending the rule of law and equal
opportunity?
1. The different balls to be juggled
1.1 The newest kid on the block: the innovation principle
Innovations often present regulators with challenges they have not yet
encountered, particularly with regard to unforeseen risks and harm. This is
reflected in the existing body of EU law on regulating innovation, which is
currently piecemeal and fragmented. In recent months, the innovation
principle has emerged as a key contender for inclusion in the EU Treaties or
at the very least for use as an overall principle in the EU’s regulatory
approach.
Although much has been written on innovation, and despite the EC having
assigned it its own Twitter account,1 there is no definitive, legal definition
of the word “innovation”. For example, in one European Commission (‘EC’)
document innovation is defined as ‘change that speeds up and improves the
way we conceive, develop, produce and access new products, industrial processes
and services. Changes that create more jobs, improve people's lives and build
greener and better societies’.2 In another paper written by the EC’s European
Political Strategy Centre innovation was recently defined as ‘anything new
that changes the society adopting it’.3
Of note is that in both papers the definition refers to ‘improvement’ as well
as ‘better’ societies. This clearly indicates that in the European mind at least,
innovation in and of itself is not a policy goal. Only qualified innovation is
being pursued: innovation that assists growth, employment, improves
peoples’ lives and builds greener and better societies.
Those speaking or publishing about innovation generally prefer not to
define it. In and of itself this is not necessarily problematic. The

@EUScienceInnov, having replaced the earlier @innovationunion on 8 November
2016.
2 European Commission, ‘Turning Europe into a true Innovation Union’, Memo
10/473 accompanying the Innovation Union Communication, 6 October 2010.
3 European Political Strategy Centre, ‘Opportunity now: Europe’s mission to
innovate’, 5 July 2016, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/epsc/pdf/publications/strategic_note_issue_15.pdf, last
accessed 3 May 2017.
1
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precautionary principle, for instance is not defined at all in the European
Treaties, although it is in the accompanying EC documents.
Scholarship, case law and policy documents on an innovation principle, on
the other hand, are limited due to the relative newness of the proposed
principle. This is not to suggest that the concept has not been seriously
considered by various stakeholders at the EU level. The innovation
principle itself was suggested by the European Risk Forum4 in 2013 in a
policy document presented by twelve (now: 22) CEOs of major
multinational companies. The Forum argues that the principle is needed to
“provide a new and positive way of ensuring that policy makers fully
recognise social and economic needs for both precaution and innovation.”5
Further, the European Commission, conscious that new technologies based
on innovation might present risks to the public interest, has recently coined
the idea of Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI).
By way of intermediate conclusion, one sees tentative movements from
both industry and policy makers towards shaping a new regulatory
approach towards innovation.
2. Limits to growth, sustainable materials management and the
circular economy
The European Environment Agency’s two reports “Late Lessons from Early
Warnings” 6 are a reminder that the introduction of new technologies
sometimes can and does go spectacularly wrong. Asbestos,7 and the use of
trans fats in our daily diet8-9 are just two examples (the former a classic
tragedy, the latter a more recent challenge).

See European Risk Forum, The Innovation Principle – Overview, available at
http://www.riskforum.eu/uploads/2/5/7/1/25710097/innovation_principle_on
e_pager_5_march_2015.pdf, last accessed 3 May 2017.
5 Ibid.
6 European Environment Agency, Late Lessons from early warnings: the precautionary
principle 1896-2000, (Environmental Issue Report No 22/2001), as well as European
Environment Agency, Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation,
(European Environment Agency, Report No 1/2013).
7 European Environment Agency, Late Lessons from early warnings: the precautionary
principle 1896-2000, (European Issue Report No 22/2001), p 51.
8 V. A. Vaclavic, E. A. Christian, Essentials of Food Science, (USA, Springer, 2014), at
244.
9 See European Parliament, “Trans Fats – Overview of Recent Developments”
March 2016,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/577966/EPRS_BRI
(2016)577966_EN.pdf last accessed 1 November 2016.
4
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Much scholarship thus far, has been devoted to risk assessment and the
precautionary principle. Yet, the precautionary principle leans heavily on
independent, objective scientific findings 10 to determine safety and as
David Gee suggests “Despite its presence in a growing body of EU and
national legislation and case law, the application of the precautionary
principle has been strongly opposed by vested interests who perceive short
term economic costs from its use. There is also intellectual resistance from
scientists who fail to acknowledge that scientific ignorance and uncertainty,
are excessively attached to conventional scientific paradigms, and who wait
for very high strengths of evidence before accepting causal links between
exposure to stressors and harm.” 11 It is precisely at this juncture that
European law is currently blocked and unable to move forward seamlessly.
Further, the continuing cycle of innovation and development arguably
clashes heads-on with the (frequently referenced by the EC) Club of Rome’s
1972 ‘Limits to Growth’ which concluded
If the present growth trends in world population, industrialisation,
pollution, food production, and resource depletion continue unchanged, the
limits to growth on this planet will be reached sometime within the next
one hundred years. The most probable result will be a rather sudden and
uncontrollable decline in both population and industrial capacity.
The 1992 Beyond the Limits 20-year update of Limits to Growth and the 2004,
30 year update continue to press the case that the earth’s finite resources
cannot sustain nations’ search for ever-expanding growth.
The EU has not been idle in the face of global resource scarcity and
unsustainability.12 It has been trying to enhance its ecological resilience and
transform itself into a comprehensive and sustainable green society. 13
See Article 6 (2) of Regulation 178/2002 laying down the general principles and
requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and
laying down procedures in matters of food safety, [2002] OJ L31/1: “Risk assessment
shall be based on the available scientific evidence and undertaken in an independent,
objective and transparent manner.”
11 European Environment Agency, Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution,
innovation, (European Environment Agency, Report No 1/2013), p.37.
12 European Commission, Roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe, COM(2011) 571, at
2.
13 See for instance EC Green Paper on Integrated Product Policy, COM(2001) 68;
Decision 1600/2002 laying down the Sixth EAP [2002] OJ L 242/1; Council
conclusions on sustainable materials management and sustainable production and
consumption, 3061st ENVIRONMENT Council meeting, Doc. 17495/10, 20
December 2010; EC, Roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe, COM(2011) 571; and EC,
Decision 1386/2013 on a General Union EAP to 2020 ‘Living well, within the limits
10
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Sustainable Materials Management - SUMMA - is one such approach
designed to support these goals.14-15 SUMMA, in effect, requires an entire
revisiting of the whole regulatory chain (including innovation). It is not a
reaction to industrial processes having gone terribly wrong or, such as in
the case of nanotechnology, to a technology of which one believes that it
might conceivably carry a number of risks, over and above the many
perceived benefits. Rather, it is an opportunity to be embraced right from
the very beginning by industry and regulators alike.
In the meantime, SUMMA has been supplemented with the EC’s ‘Circular
Economy’ plans. Late 2015, the EC adopted the Circular Economy Package
aimed at promoting the transition to a sustainable, low carbon, resource
efficient and competitive economy in the European Union.16 The concept of
making the economy ‘circular’ is very comprehensive. It not only aims at
minimizing the environmental impact of the use of materials, but also seeks
to preserve resources and to reduce waste throughout the entire life-cycle(s)
of a material, while aiming at economic growth and social equity. In this
context, the Commission launched a pilot scheme on “Innovation Deals”, to
“help innovators with promising solutions to environmental issues to
navigate regulatory challenges to bringing their ideas to market.”17
3. A needs assessment?
What we currently research in the context of the needs /innovation
conundrum is a credible, properly considered “needs” assessment.
Unsurprisingly, given the examples of false negatives set out in the
European Environment Agency’s (EEA) Late Lessons, 18 politicians and
regulators have devoted most of their energies into assessing whether
certain innovations are harmful or not. Much scholarship thus far, has been
devoted to risk assessment and the precautionary principle – yet the

of our planet’, 28 December 2013, [2013] OJ L 354/171 (the Seventh Union
Environment Action Programme).
14 OECD, Working Group on Waste Prevention and Recycling, Outcome of the first
workshop on SMM, Seoul, 28-30 November 2005.
15 Available at http://goo.gl/6DjR7t, last accessed 3 May 2017.
16 The Package includes an Action Plan: European Commission, Closing the loop –
An EU action plan for the Circular Economy, COM(2015) 614.
17 European Commission, Innovation Deals for a Circular Economy, available at
https://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-deals/index.cfm, last accessed 3 May
2017.
18 European Environment Agency, Late Lessons from early warnings: the precautionary
principle 1896-2000, (Environmental Issue Report No 22/2001), as well as European
Environment Agency, Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation,
(European Environment Agency, Report No 1/2013).
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findings of independent scientists are increasingly being challenged and
disputed by civil society, NGO’s and some scientists themselves.
One way out of this bottle-neck, in cases where the precautionary principle
fails, would be to introduce a “needs” assessment. To date regulators have
rarely questioned whether certain controversial innovations are needed
and by whom? Looking at the EEA’s false negatives – i.e. where early
warnings were ignored and later led to damage – not all innovations are
needed and not all innovations benefit the public good.
Before such a needs test be used in practice – if at all, plenty of decisions on
its operation need to be assessed:
- Who or what would or could trigger it?
- Where and when should it be applied: During an Impact
Assessment? Prior to the risk assessment? After? The latter is
unlikely for if a needs assessment were to be rolled out, efficiency
suggests its intervention should take place prior to the market stage
of the product.
- What should be the objective criteria for setting such a test?
- How would such a needs test fit in with the EU’s Better Regulation
programme?
Our core proposition for needs based assessment, is a regulatory regime
which weeds out B2C products in particular which grant little true
advance. An important consideration in our thinking about a needs
assessment is that it will only apply to ‘new’ or ‘novel’ products and ditto
technologies. Many consumer products in particular, even when further
refined, do not need regulatory approval even when their design and
performance is updated. A bicycle, say, that is made of lighter steel and
therefore performs better, does not need to pass a regulatory approval
process. Ditto for a washing machine that now manages to remove certain
infectious bacteria. Yet if that lightweight character is a result of
nanotechnology-enabled steel qualities, or the sterilisation the result of
nano silver particles, the bicycle cq washing machine would be ‘new’ and
consequently regulatory approval should have to be sought.
Needless to stay, a revisit of the concept or indeed definition of
‘new’ technologies will be part of the analysis.
One solution could be, by way of example, to suggest that only if
both commerce as well as the public benefit from a new technology does it
pass the “needs” assessment. We would also consider whether, if a needbased assessment on the development side of products were to be
impossible, one could develop a model which better disciplines the creation
of need (marketing and communication, in particular). These exist in e.g.
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the pharmaceuticals sector, and they have of course been tried in the
environment sector (mostly through codes of conduct) as well as the health
sector (eg regulation of tobacco).
In our mind the biggest challenges to a needs assessment in this context are
the following:
3.1 Are there examples of needs-based regulation which could guide us
in this respect?
We believe there are, albeit that they have not come to full fruition, and
neither do they start from a perception of public needs. At first sight, a
needs-based assessment would seem to go against our engrained belief that
if (in and of itself already a big if) there are no demonstrable adverse effects
of a particular product, on human health and /or the environment, a
product should be marketable.
REACH, the European Regulation on the registration and
authorisation of chemicals, is specifically designed to encourage companies
to substitute ‘substances of very high concern’ (SVHCs): this is a direct
response to those substances’ impact on human health and /or the
environment. Yet the more general overall consequence of REACH is for
companies to think twice before they submitted the vast amount of
chemicals de facto on the market, to the REACH process. Plenty of
chemicals were not so registered and, under the ‘no data no market’ rule,
disappeared from the market.
The mechanism behind this withdrawal from the market therefore
is one of economic rationale: will the expense involved in the registration
process be worth it, in view of forecast sales. REACH in this respect fulfils a
fairly static role: other than in the very existence of the regulatory approval
process, there is no direct involvement in the companies’ decision tree of
seeking authorisation, rather than withdrawal.
This is different in market-based instruments, in particular
environmental taxation and tradeable emission rights. The former of course
in the current institutional set-up, are the exclusive domain of the Member
States. In the latter, the European emissions trading scheme for greenhouse
gas-related emissions, is a prominent example (but there are others, in
other jurisdictions).
One of the very premises behind a successful market, is that the
allowances shrink over time. Depending on the valuation attached by
individual companies to the final product of the production process
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requiring allowances, companies decide whether or not to discontinue the
production line. In this way, too, the regulator outsources the ‘benefits’
assessment to the private operator, but with a more dynamic role in that
process. Shrinking the number of available allowances has an immediate
impact on industry’s evaluation process.
ETS and REACH in our view are examples of needs assessment
imposed by (stronger than ‘nudged’19 we would suggest) the legislator and
/or regulator, but ultimately carried out by industry itself. Industry then
translates ‘needs’ as ‘opportunities’ (read: profit margins). If, such as in
ETS, the regulatory policy goals coincide with the economic assessment
made by industry, the needs ‘v’ profit assessment in our view does not
really matter.
What our research looks for however is a wider probe of needs
assessment, not just for cherry-picked sectors in which the no data, no
market rule has been accepted (famously for instance rejected in the case of
the cosmetics sector), or an emissions trading system has been put into
place. Inspiration in this respect no doubt can be drawn from e.g. Norway,
where by way of example, for GMO’s to be approved, the applicant is
required to show that the product contributes towards society as a whole
and is sustainable.20
3.2 Can a regulatory regime offer selection without offending the rule
of law and equal opportunity?
‘The rule of law’ is a concept so often uttered, sometimes unashamedly, by
lawyers, politicians, the media and crooks alike, that it risks becoming
meaningless. Attempts at defining the rule of law are numerous, and they
vary widely in their remit, however they all do seem to have one building
block in common: and that is precisely judicial review. In the sixth Sir David
Williams lecture, delivered by the late Lord Bingham of Cornhill, then the
United Kingdom’s senior law lord, at Cambridge University, Lord
Bingham makes a good attempt at identifying the core of the rule of law,
when stating
The core of the existing principle is, I suggest, that all persons and
authorities within the state, whether public or private, should be bound by
See e.g. K. Mathis and A. Tor, (eds.) Nudging – Possibilities, limitations and
applications in European law and economics, Lucerne, Springer, 2016.
20 G. Kristin Rosendal and Ann Ingeborg Myhr, GMO Assessment in Norway :
societal utility and sustainable development, EMBO Reports, Sep 2009 (10) 9. 939940. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2750045/ last accessed 3
May 2017.
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and entitled to the benefit of laws publicly and prospectively promulgated
and publicly administered in the courts.
He immediately qualifies his own definition, pointing out that not all its
elements need be present at all times – for instance administration of the
law by the courts may under circumstances be best served privately. Lord
Bingham then sets out to define what he called the eight sub-rules of the
rule of law.21
1. the law must be accessible and so far as possible intelligible, clear and
predictable
2. questions of legal right and liability should ordinarily be resolved by
application of the law and not the exercise of discretion
3. the laws of the land should apply equally to all, save to the extent that
objective differences justify differentiation
4. the law must afford adequate protection of fundamental human rights
5. means must be provided for resolving, without prohibitive cost or
inordinate delay, bona fide civil disputes which the parties themselves are
unable to resolve
6. ministers and public officers at all levels must exercise the powers
conferred on them reasonably, in good faith, for the purpose for which the
powers were conferred and without exceeding the limits of such powers
7. adjudicative procedures provided by the state should be fair, and
8. the state must comply with its obligations in international law, the law
which whether deriving from treaty or international custom and practice
governs the conduct of nations.
If a needs assessment were to be rolled out, bullet-points 1, 2 and 4 in our
view would be the most challenging. 1 especially for the issue of
predictability; 2 for it challenges us to think of a mechanism of who would
be making, or disciplining, the needs assessment; and 4, for freedom of
commerce /freedom to conduct a business is a fundamental right (see i.a.
Article 16 of the European Charter; albeit one that is immediately qualified).
3.3 How can one roll-out needs assessment without endangering ‘blue
sky research’?
It is important to point out that our research is not a second-guessing of
scientific advance. Many important breakthroughs have been inspired by
prior, seemingly pointless developments in manufacturing, science and

See
https://www.cpl.law.cam.ac.uk/sites/www.law.cam.ac.uk/files/images/www.c
pl.law.cam.ac.uk/legacy/Media/THE%20RULE%20OF%20LAW%202006.pdf last
accessed 14 July 2017.
21
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engineering. However at the same time, considerable ‘fundamental’
research is being pushed through in spite of ecological, health and ethical
concerns ‘in the name of science’. Precisely how a needs assessment will
balance these requirements will be a challenge in which traditional
instruments of proportionality will probably not suffice.
Conclusion
Our research is a challenge, but we relish it. The findings of this research
will feed into a stream-lined, revised regulatory structure that is compatible
with and complimentary to the EU’s, Better Regulation agenda, its Circular
Economy objectives and its Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI)
strategy. This research will be anchored upon our track record in the
regulation of new technologies; regulatory design (agencies and ‘new’
methods of regulation in particular); and our insight, both in scholarship
and in practice, into various areas of commercial law.
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The Rule of Law in EU’s Innovation
Society: Framing technology
Tamara K Hervey
1 Introduction and Summary
It is often claimed that EU law’s approach to novel technologies is framed
by notions of the market. In terms of its technical legal status, much of EU
law on novel technologies falls within the EU’s competence to regulate the
internal market. A variant of the ‘constitutional asymmetry’ argument1 is
often made here: the constitutional centrality to the rule of EU law of
market creation and sustaining the internal market inhibits the scope of EU
law, and forces the market to be legally framed as the ‘rule’. Other values
are legally framed as outside EU competence and/or as exceptions to that
rule.
Using the examples of medical devices and novel pharmaceuticals
regulation, we can see that, on the contrary, other values are also present in
the ways in which EU law frames technologies. These values include the
constitutional position of human rights; human dignity; and the notion that
the EU’s market is a particularly safe and particularly ethical market, when
considered in global contexts.
This analysis leaves the way open for a critique of the extent to which EU
law meets the EU’s apparent self-set aims encapsulated in these values.
2 The ‘standard narrative’ – the rule of EU market law
The ‘standard narrative’ about how EU law frames technology and
technological development is very familiar. It describes the relationship
between EU law and technology/innovation thus:

© Tamara Hervey

Tamara Hervey is Jean Monnet Professor of European Union Law at the
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1 Eg, Scharpf, F.W., ‘The asymmetry of European integration, or why the EU
cannot be a “social market economy”’ (2010) 8(2) Socio-Economic Review 211.
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The EU often frames technology as a market commodity and innovation as
a perspective for growth in the EU economy. Ethical and fundamental
rights perspectives remain subsidiary.
The narrative infuses EU policy statements, and drives policy, EU and
national budgetary disbursement, soft law, and other governance activities.
EU law operates to support and uphold this dominant frame.2
The ways in which EU (free movement and competition) law does this are
also well-known. Drawing on Polanyi, 3 Fritz Scharpf described the
‘constitutional asymmetry’ between the EU’s internal market and social law.
In EU member states, ‘economic policy’ and ‘social policy’ enjoy the same
constitutional status. But in the EU, economic policy is the rule. The EU’s
economic policy is embodied in EU laws – laws on monetary and fiscal
discipline, fair competition, and – above all – free trade in the internal
market. The EU Treaties embody privately enforceable rights which create
and sustain free trade within competitive markets. These rules are
‘supreme’ – that is, applicable in priority over contradictory rules of
national law. So long as the relevant areas of national law fall within the
scope of EU law, discussion over the appropriate balance between
competing interests (for Scharpf, market versus social/employment rights)
is subsumed into the legal and institutional structures of EU law, as
presently constituted.4 When the CJEU adopted an expansive approach to
the scope of application of key provisions of the EU treaties, such as those
on free movement of products and services within EU law, it changed the
constitutional settlement. The market became the rule: the social the
exception. The EU legislature was (and remains) incapable of redressing
this state of affairs. The EU legislature is competent to adopt EU internal
market legislation, but not (in general) social legislation. EU law thus
inverts the relations between market and society. Rather than the market
serving society – with all that entails for law-making and the political
arrangements that support lawmaking in democratic societies – EU law
sees social relations as embedded within the economic system.

The idea that the way in which the law ‘frames’ or ‘conceptualises’ something is
crucial to the way in which the law operates is familiar in legal sociology and
policy studies. See, eg Hajer and Laws, ‘Ordering through Discourse’ in Moran et
al (eds) Oxford Handbook of Public Policy (OUP 2006).
3 Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of our Time
(republished 2nd ed Beacon Press 2002).
4 See, for instance, for an argument to the effect that to constitutionalise present EU
institutional arrangements would be dangerous for solidarity, Grimm, ‘Does
Europe Need a Constitution?’ 1 ELJ (1995) 282.
2
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Others have developed similar arguments in different contexts. Gareth
Davies, for instance, considers the place of cultural rights in EU law. Davies
argues that, in subsuming to itself the question of whether national policies
or measures which embody aspects of national culture (for instance, to do
with food, or entertainment) are permitted within EU internal market law,
the CJEU disrupts constitutional settlements.5 Chris Newdick and others6
have argued that when the CJEU held that EU market law applies to
individual patients crossing borders to receive health services in hospitals,
it threatened the significant ‘planification’ that goes into hospital provision,
and the delicate balance of national social insurance and taxation systems
that support that balance. Many human rights lawyers (an early example is
Jason Coppell and Aidan O’Neill 7 ) and indeed several national
constitutional courts consider that the way that EU market law frames
human rights as an exception to the rule of the market is a constitutional
affront to the position of human rights in European societies and in
national constitutions. Human rights – they argue – should not be an
exception to the rule of free movement of the factors of production in EU
law. The competence of the EU and the scope of EU law should not extend
so far as to undermine human rights settlements.
In 2013, Gordon Bache, Mark Flear and I showed how the dominant frame
for EU law on new health technologies (particularly pharmaceuticals) is the
market. 8 The rationale for EU legislation on new health technologies is
typically to create and sustain the internal market, to provide a favourable
environment for European industries to market their products and services
within the whole of the EU, and to optimize regulatory conditions so that
European-based companies can compete effectively in global markets. We
see similar narratives about how EU law understands other technological
developments.
3 A more nuanced narrative – the rule of other values in EU (market) law

Davies, ‘Internal Market Adjudication and the Quality of Life in Europe’ 21
Columbia Journal of European Law (2014-15) 289.
6 Newdick, ‘The European Court of Justice, Transnational Health Care, and Social
Citizenship - Accidental Death of a Concept?’ (2009) 26 Wisconsin International Law
Journal 845; Glinos, I.A. and Baeten, R., ‘A Literature Review of Cross-Border
Patient Mobility in the European Union’ (Observatoire Social Européen 2006).
7 Coppell, J. and O’Neill, A., ‘The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights
Seriously?’ (1992) 29 Common Market Law Review 669.
8 Bache, Flear and Hervey, ‘The Defining Features of the EU’s Approach to
Regulating New Health Technologies’ in Flear, Farrell, Hervey, Murphy, eds,
European Law and New Health Technologies (OUP 2013).
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Three main legal techniques are used to pursue other values in EU law:
scope of application rules; competence rules; and exceptions.
3.1 Scope rules
Both medical devices and pharmaceuticals are products where
technological change is both driven by market actors and affects markets.
Among the resources available to them, market actors have EU law as a
potential source to challenge any limitations on their access to markets (that
is to say, to patients, or to health systems). Both the legislative rules and the
Treaty rules can be interpreted as pro-market and entirely or almost
entirely disregarding of other values. The internet is also an important
(new) technology here. For instance, the latest in a long line of cases in
which an internet pharmacy relied on EU law to challenge regulatory
interventions in its access to consumers (patients) was recently decided by
the CJEU.9 Repeat litigators such as DocMorris the internet pharmacy are
important actors here.
National competition authorities may use EU competition law to tackle
anti-competitive arrangements (cartels or monopolies) in markets for
pharmaceuticals or medical devices. The basic aims of EU competition law
are to prevent anti-competitive behaviour, and punish it where it occurs.
Several prominent EU competition lawyers, for instance Giorgio Monti,
suggest that the goals of EU competition law include to ‘maximise
economic freedom, … promote national champions … protect small firms,
safeguard cultural values … and so on’.10 EU law is also used to promote
solidarity within health systems, through inter alia securing access to novel
health technologies (pharmaceuticals or medical devices) as early as
possible for as many patients as possible (hence as cheaply as possible). (It
is also possible to argue that EU competition law is also used to support
national champions within the relevant industries, or to support European
champions in global markets.)
An illustrative example is the way in which EU competition law has been
used to tackle market behaviour affecting the pricing of novel medical
devices and pharmaceuticals in European markets. Antitrust authorities in
France, Italy, Finland, Ireland and Latvia have all relied on EU competition
law to break up anti-competitive pricing arrangements which essentially
seek to hinder the entry of generic medicines into national health systems,
particularly hospitals. In so doing, the rule of EU competition law has been
interpreted broadly, in ways that de facto promote an aim related to the
solidarity values which underpins European health systems.
9

Case C-148/15 Deutsche Parkinson Vereinigung.
Monti, EU Competition Law (CUP 2007) p 4.
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We can also point to the scope of the Treaty rules on free movement of
products. These rules (particularly in interaction with EU legislation) can
also be interpreted so as to protect or promote such ‘non-market’ values,
such as the protection of vulnerable consumers. For instance, the
interactions between Article 34 TFEU, EU public procurement law, and EU
consumer protection law can have this effect. Medical devices sold within
the EU fall under the CE system, which seeks to secure a single European
market in products which are safe for consumers. The EU Medical Devices
legislation harmonises the inspection and certification processes applicable
to medical devices sold within the EU. This looks like the standard
narrative: EU free movement law being used to secure market access to the
detriment of a competing value (patient safety, or perhaps professional
judgment). But if a Member State is concerned about the safety of a device,
it may withdraw the device from its market, provided it follows the
procedure set out in the EU legislation.11 The result is that the scope of the
Treaty provision only imposes a procedural obligation on the Member State:
if patient/consumer safety is a concern, then that can be pursued, provided
that the procedure set by EU legislation for doing so is followed.
3.2 Competence rules
There is no doubt at all that much EU legislation on pharmaceuticals and
medical devices is driven by values of the internal market. The legal basis
for the vast majority of relevant EU legislation is Article 114 TFEU, which
gives the EU competence to create and sustain its internal market. A typical
expression, from the EU’s pharmaceuticals legislation, of the underpinning
rationale for EU law regulating new health technologies is
Trade in medicinal products within the [EU] is hindered by disparities
between certain national provisions, in particular between provisions
relating to medicinal products . . . and such disparities directly affect the
functioning of the internal market.12
This focus dates back to the oldest EU pharmaceutical legislation from the
1960s. EU regulatory agencies, such as the European Medicines Agency,
and also those bodies which support the CE system, all operate within a
market frame. The very need for these regulatory systems is justified by the
need to secure harmonised arrangements for placing new health
technologies on the market. European industries can reach the whole of the
EU market, and are thus better equipped to compete on global markets.
The EU’s competence constrains the scope of EU legislation, and the way
that it is interpreted and understood. The way in which the CJEU
11
12

Directive 93/42/EEC, Article 8.
Directive 2001/83/EC, as amended, Recital 4.
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interprets the competence of the EU legislature to adopt legislation, and
consequently the scope and interpretation of that legislation, implies not
simply a market-driven approach. Rather, the idea is articulated that the
EU’s internal market is an ethical, human-rights compliant market.
We see this idea in many other areas of EU legislation of relevance to
technological development: the EU’s Data Protection legislation, its Clinical
Trials legislation, its legislation on human cells, tissues and organs, and so
on. The CJEU articulates a strong ethics of human dignity, drawing on
Europe’s human rights traditions, as implicit in the settlement which
determines the competence of the EU to legislate. Outside of that scope,
national settlements on the balance between market and ethics/human
rights apply.
Equally, we can see that the EU’s internal market legislation also embodies
the idea that the EU is a safe market. The EU’s pharmaceuticals legislation,
which requires a marketing authorisation for any new pharmaceutical to be
sold in the EU, is the strongest example. The direction of travel of the EU’s
legislation on medical devices shows a similar cautious and precautionary
approach.
3.3 Public interest justification exceptions
The EU’s market is not an unregulated market. EU law leaves scope for
market interventions where justified on the basis of a public interest. The
very fact that other public interests are an exception and the market is the
rule underlines the dominant narrative. The constitutional settlement in
each of the EU Member States does not have markets in such a central place
in terms of political and economic life. Competing interests, principles and
values are articulated through political processes, and enshrined in law. If
the system operates with legal hierarchies, market rules are not always
superordinate in the hierarchy: often, for instance, human rights are.
The relationship between the rule of the EU’s market and the exception of
public interests is de facto managed through the application by courts of
the principle of proportionality. But proportionality is notoriously a legal
principle of significant flexibility. It can range from light touch review, to
strict standard oversight. Speaking formally, constitutionally, the CJEU is
the court which determines the proportionality standard to be applied. But
in practice the actual application of the proportionality test is in most
instances by national courts. So here there is scope for national courts to
engage in creative interpretative practice.13
The scope within which such interpretative practice can be exercised is, of course,
subject to the danger inherent in invoking an exception, in that if a particular
13
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Public interest justifications have been raised in terms of the application of
EU free movement and competition law based on values of solidarity,
ethics of consumer/patient protection, human dignity and fundamental
human rights, and precautionary approaches to risk. The legal relationship
between rule and exception, mediated through the proportionality
principle, does not always result in the rule of the market being the decisive
factor.
4 A way open for critique – to what extent does EU law meet its self-set
values?
If we accept that EU law is not ‘constitutionally encoded’ so that its
function is above all to create, protect and sustain markets, but that
sometimes EU law requires and supports the protection of other values, we
can approach a critique of EU law quite differently than if we do not.
Novel technologies challenge political settlements, and perforce legal rules
that seek to encapsulate those settlements. If we think of EU law as about
technocratic rule, not value-driven law making, the logical consequence is
that EU competence needs to be tightly constrained, and the EU and its
law-making powers must not be enabled to disrupt politically legitimated
decisions at national level. That critique of the EU: it certainly has its place.
But the EU’s powers have increased. The dynamic of EU law has supported
encroachment into areas of national life almost certainly unforeseen in the
1950s. We could decry that the EU has powers over the regulation of such
matters, and seek to reduce the EU’s control (yes, even to the point of
leaving the EU). Or we could hold the EU to account for its exercise of
power, and the effects of its lawmaking.
If we want to do that latter, our critique will be stronger if we ask whether
EU law meets its self-set standards. It’s no accident that the Treaty on
European Union states that the EU is ‘founded on the values of respect for
human dignity … and respect for human rights’.14 These statements are as
much a part of the EU’s constitutional encoding as the provisions in the
TFEU on free movement of products and free and fair competition, and on
the EU’s constrained competences in areas outside internal market law. Let
national court protects values against free movement, they might be found liable in
damages for breaching EU law by another national court, following the ruling in
Case C-224/01 Köbler. However, this danger is relatively remote in practice, given
that national courts are likely to be equally sensitive to contextual specificities
within their Member State. Thanks to Christina Eckes for encouraging me to think
through this point.
14 Article 1 TEU.
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us therefore argue that EU law is encoded to articulate a market that is
respectful of human dignity and fundamental human rights; that is
precautionary when it comes to risk of harm to consumers; that is
respectful of solidarity-based welfare settlements. And let us then hold the
EU institutions to account on the basis of that market when they make, apply,
or interpret EU law. Equally, let us hold national institutions to account
when they take decisions that overplay market values, under the ‘cover’ or
excuse of EU law obligations. Rather, let us move debates away from ‘EU
or national competence’ towards the substance of decisions and which
values they embody.
Conclusions
There is much about EU law’s approach to novel technologies that is
framed and infused by notions of the market. In terms of its technical legal
status, much of EU law on novel technologies does fall within the EU’s
competence to regulate the internal market, and to secure a level playing
field for actors within that market, free from anti-competitive and abusive
practices of powerful market players. I agree that the constitutional
centrality to the rule of EU law of market creation and sustaining the
internal market inhibits the scope of EU law, and forces the market to be
legally framed as the ‘rule’. Other values are legally framed as outside EU
competence and/or as exceptions to that rule.
But my considered position is that to argue that EU law is constitutionally
fixed – so that values other than the market can never effectively drive or
influence the way that EU law frames social policy, cultural policy, human
rights, ethics (or any other competing value) – is an over-statement. It
underplays the dynamic potential of law and the contingency and
malleability of legal texts. It ignores, for instance, the ways in which legal
concepts such as proportionality are interpreted and applied in practice. It
ignores the ways in which scope rules of EU law can be drawn, for instance
to secure only procedural but not substantive control over nationally
determined decisions driven by non-market values. I think a more nuanced
position is a better statement of the legal position, and the nature of the rule
of EU law in framing technologies.
The standard narrative, if we accept it, means forgetting that EU law can be
a force and a site for the socially/culturally/ethically progressive, or at
least foregoing the opportunity to develop EU law in that way. Moreover,
if we simply accept the standard narrative, we constrain ourselves in the
ways in which we might hold the EU to account for values other than
market values. We deprive ourselves of deploying the dynamic and
malleable potential of legal texts in the ways EU law rules and frames
technology.

64

Electroniccopy
copy available
available at:
Electronic
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3005914
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3005914

